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INTRODUCTION

W

ith budget constraints and a mission that has been expanded by
Congress over time, it is not surprising that the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) is looking for new tools to maximize its enforcement
efficiency. Ever-advancing technology provides new opportunities for
the IRS, and in turn, new privacy concerns for taxpayers.
In December 2018, the IRS made headlines when it issued a request
for information (RFI) seeking social media research tools available in
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the marketplace.1 In its RFI, the IRS referenced the limits on its own
employees’ abilities to engage in social media research,2 and it stated
its hope to engage a vendor-supplied tool that would allow the agency
to access publicly available social media to “expedite IRS case
resolution for existing compliance cases, providing a more efficient
way of identifying resources and assisting with the collection of known
tax deficiencies, leading to increased collection of revenue involving
unfiled tax returns and other tax liabilities.”3 The RFI noted that the
agency “respects taxpayer rights” and stated that “such a tool would
not be used to search the internet or social media sites for purposes of
identifying or initiating new tax audits” but rather to “assist with
previously identified tax compliance cases.”4
The RFI also mentions a potential benefit to taxpayers, which is that
the IRS believes a social media mining tool could aid in the resolution
of tax-related identity theft.5 The RFI does not elaborate further on this
potential use, though it is worth imagining how the IRS might use
social media constructively rather than for enforcement.6 The RFI
concludes by noting that the IRS intends to “be mindful that frequently
information posted on social media and the internet may be wrong or
misleading.”7
The RFI does not explicitly define the term “social media” or list
examples of the sites the IRS is interested in reviewing. Presumably the
term would encompass websites in which users create profiles and may
interact with one another, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and
LinkedIn.8 Demographic studies reveal that a majority of American
1 Jared Gilmour, The IRS Wants Help Scouring Social Media for Clues on Tax Cheats,
MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 28, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation
-world/national/article223681430.html.
2 The RFI cites to IRM 11.3.21.8.1(4) as prohibiting IRS employees from logging into
social media sites to carry out compliance-related work and states that “the IRS currently
has no formal tool to access [] public information [used by taxpayers to advertise, promote,
and sell products and services], compile social media feeds, or search multiple social media
sites.” DEP’T OF TREASURY, IRS, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, SOLICITATION NO.
2032H8-RFI-MEDIA, SOCIAL MEDIA RESEARCH REQUEST (Dec. 18, 2018) [hereinafter
IRS RFI].
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See discussion infra Section II.C.6.
7 IRS RFI, supra note 2; see also infra Section II.A (discussing the seeming contradiction
between the IRS’s goals of efficiency and the extra cost and work that would be required
for a human being to sort through misleading claims).
8 See Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/03/01/social-media-use
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adults use Facebook and YouTube on their computer or cellphone.9
Younger adults (age 18–24) use a wider variety of sites and do so more
frequently.10 A 2012 study showed that younger adults are more likely
to use social media than older adults, and urban dwellers are
significantly more likely to use social media than those who live in
rural areas; however, the study did not reveal a statistically significant
disparity in overall social media site use across different household
income levels.11 Interestingly, even those who abstain from social
media may not be as hidden from sight as they think. Researchers report
that individuals with no social media accounts themselves are likely
drawn into this public sphere, with algorithms able to draw predictive
and reasonably accurate12 findings about an individual based upon
postings by those of the individual’s friends, family, and acquaintances
who do have a social media presence.13
The thought of IRS employees searching through individual
taxpayers’ social media sites presents concerns on multiple fronts:
What policies or limits might the agency adopt? Might the IRS later
expand the program beyond the stated intention to use such practices
only in existing compliance cases? This Article begins by considering
the potential implications to taxpayer privacy rights of such an
initiative, and questions whether it may conflict with the statutory
notion of a taxpayer’s right to privacy.14 Speaking for myself, I bristle
-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/L432-JGTW]. Smith and Anderson also define social media as
including YouTube, Snapchat, Pinterest, and WhatsApp. Id.
9 Id. (noting that 68% of American adults are Facebook users, with 74% of Facebook
users accessing it on a daily basis, and that a majority of American adults in all demographic
groups, other than individuals 65 and older, currently use Facebook).
10 Id.
11 Maeve Duggan & Joanna Brenner, The Demographics of Social Media Users — 2012,
PEW RSCH. CTR. 3 (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2013/02/14/the
-demographics-of-social-media-users-2012/ [https://perma.cc/U8AX-8NXN].
12 Jessica Baron, Think Your Data Is Private Because You’re Not on Social Media?
Think Again, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2019, 8:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jessicabaron
/2019/01/23/think-your-data-is-private-because-youre-not-on-social-media-think-again
/#7ab38b814a16 [https://perma.cc/HL8C-2BQW] (“The original user’s Tweets allowed
them to predict future tweets with an accuracy rate of roughly 64% and the user’s contacts
gave them enough data to predict behavior with an accuracy rate of 61%.”).
13 Id. Baron’s article describes the work of James P. Bagrow et al., Information Flow
Reveals Prediction Limits in Online Social Activity, 3 NAT. HUM. BEHAV. 122, 122 (2019)
(“As few as 8–9 of an individual’s contacts are sufficient to obtain predictability comparable
to that of the individual alone.”).
14 Concerns about taxpayer privacy are certainly not new. Tax scholars such as Michael
Hatfield have written multiple thoughtful pieces addressing privacy in taxation, including
the scope of the IRS’s power to collect personal information. See Michael Hatfield, Privacy
in Taxation, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 579, 581 (2017) (“[A]mong government agencies, the
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at the idea of the IRS staking out an ever-more invasive footprint into
the private life of any individual taxpayer. Regardless of one’s views
on taxpayer privacy, this Article makes a deeper inquiry: it asks not
whether the IRS has the right to access and use this information for
examination and collections purposes but whether, as a matter of social
policy, it is appropriate and desirable for the IRS to trawl for such
information, and to do so in a civil context as opposed to in a criminal
case.
Beyond questions of privacy, a broader concern is the potential for
social media mining to create disproportionate harms for low-income
taxpayers. As this Article will describe, low-income taxpayers are
already subject to disproportionate rates of tax enforcement relative to
most other income bands. Moreover, this economically vulnerable
population is also subject to intrusive and judgmental monitoring in
other contexts.15 On balance, it strikes me that to use social media
mining as a tax enforcement tool is to simply add a layer of further
indignity onto a population that is already subject to increased digital
surveillance by virtue of lacking income or wealth.
Thus, the primary focus of this Article is to question whether, in light
of the IRS’s need to make the most of diminished resources,16 it is
equitable to further automate its examination and collections tactics in
a way that punishes unsophisticated behavior. In particular, this Article
articulates a concern that the use of social media mining may pose a
greater harm to low-income taxpayers relative to other types of
taxpayers, in part because it is easier for the IRS to direct automated
resources at the types of issues involved in examining those returns.17
Many low-income families rely on the tax filing system to claim critical
social welfare benefits such as the earned income tax credit and child
IRS has the broadest legal authority to collect information that minimizes privacy . . . .”).
Likewise, Kimberly Houser and Debra Sanders have raised concerns about how the IRS is
already using social media to collect taxpayer information, asserting that the IRS is engaging
in social media data mining in ways that breach taxpayer privacy. Kimberly A. Houser &
Debra Sanders, The Use of Big Data Analytics by the IRS: Efficient Solutions or the End of
Privacy as We Know It?, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 817 (2017).
15 See infra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., IRS Oversight: Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th
Cong. 86 (2019) (testimony of J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration) [hereinafter George testimony]; Robert A. Weinberger, Budget Blues for
Tax Administration, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 13, 2020) (showing in a chart how IRS
appropriations fell by 21% from 2010 to 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox
/budget-blues-tax-administration [https://perma.cc/G6ML-U2UY].
17 See infra Section I.B.2.

306

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99, 301

tax credit. Congress has chosen this system to reward and incentivize
work and to help lift working families from poverty.18 In many cases,
the working families eligible for these benefits have a zero-tax liability
because they earn less than the standard deduction. While taxpayers
with annual income below the standard deduction are generally not
required to file an income tax return, they must file a return to claim
these valuable refundable credits. Concerns about how enforcement
techniques involving social media mining may disproportionately
impact low-income taxpayers are especially relevant in light of data
from recent years showing that the IRS audits the poor at a similar rate
to the highest-earning taxpayers19 and in light of the IRS defending that
practice as justified given its available resources.20
To clarify, this Article does not condone tax noncompliance, and
as a tax attorney, I would never advise my clients that “a little cheating
is OK.” While taxpayer privacy and the possibility of disparate
treatment of taxpayers are the main concerns of this Article, my
thoughts are tempered with realism and cost-benefit considerations.
Just as the police tolerate a little bit of speeding (e.g., ignoring those
who drive seventy-four miles per hour in a seventy mile per hour zone,
but pursuing those who drive eighty-five miles per hour), it does not
seem practical or cost efficient to pursue every perceived case of tax
18 See, e.g., MICHELLE LYON DRUMBL, TAX CREDITS FOR THE WORKING POOR: A
CALL FOR REFORM (2019) (detailing the history of the earned income tax credit and child
tax credit and exploring the reasons why Congress has chosen the IRS to administer these
social benefits).
19 Paul Kiel, It’s Getting Worse: The IRS Now Audits Poor Americans at About the Same
Rate as the Top 1%, PROPUBLICA (May 30, 2019, 10:16 AM), https://www.propublica.org
/article/irs-now-audits-poor-americans-at-about-the-same-rate-as-the-top-1-percent [https:
//perma.cc/CAK2-SE25].
20 William Hoffman, IRS Exams Focus on EITC Claims, Not Poor, Inspector General
Says, TAX NOTES TODAY (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today
-federal/tax-system-administration/irs-exams-focus-eitc-claims-not-poor-inspector-general
-says/2019/09/27/29zm4 [https://perma.cc/G4RK-P9WE]. Subcommittee Chair Mike
Quigley asked, “So if you have fewer resources, it makes sense to audit poor people more?”
In response, Treasury Inspector General J. Russell George replied, “It’s somewhat more
complicated than that” and explained that audit work on EITC claimants is easier than on
high-income taxpayers, “especially with the work of junior IRS employees. . . . The more
sophisticated the income tax, the more involved it is, the longer it takes. It really boils down
to how [the IRS] allocates their resources.” Id. (alteration in original). Hoffman reports that
when asked about possible racism or bias in IRS examination policies, George replied,
“None of our work has shown any evidence that bias is occurring in terms of those with
money versus those with less money . . . [b]ut there is no question that more low-income
people are being examined than upper-income people.” Id.; see also George testimony,
supra note 16, at 86 (“As a percentage of overall enforcement revenue collected, the amount
attributable to automated [functions are] increasing . . . [while o]ther types of enforcement
actions . . . are decreasing.”).

2021]

#Audited: Social Media and Tax Enforcement

307

noncompliance. For example, is it worth it to devote resources to
having the IRS manually investigate every social media post that
suggests any hint of unreported income, no matter how small in dollar
amount?21
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies the growing
trend for public agencies and private third parties to use social media,
automation, and other tools of technology to monitor or collect
information on individuals. It identifies concerns and tensions that arise
from this trend. It then considers how a taxpayer’s statutory “right to
privacy” applies in the context of information made available online by
the taxpayer. While the taxpayer right to privacy is not clearly defined,
it appears to refer to more than just the right of confidentiality of
taxpayer information. Part II frames the issue of social media mining
within broader reactions to punishing (or choosing not to punish)
unsophisticated behavior and raises thoughts about how social media
mining is different than investigating tips from whistleblowers. Part II
then makes several proposals for the IRS to consider, starting with a
call for the agency to provide the public with a clearer explanation of
its understanding of the taxpayer “right to privacy.” Part III, proceeding
under the assumption that the IRS can and will access social media for
enforcement purposes,22 provides takeaways and thoughts for those
attorneys who advocate on behalf of low-income taxpayers and
represent them in their controversies with the IRS.
I
TENSIONS ARISING FROM THE COLLISION OF AUTOMATION,
CONVENIENCE, PRIVACY, AND EXPECTATIONS
Examples abound of federal and state agencies, as well as private
third parties, using big data algorithms, automated systems, and other
tools of technology (including, but not limited to, social media mining)
to monitor or collect information on individuals. In some cases,
21 This fits within broader questions of the appropriateness of leeway in law
enforcement. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Falling Short in the Data Age (working paper)
(on file with author) (“[I]ncreasing access to data and information will change the
availability and shape of informal leeway in the law.”).
22 While the primary focus of this Article is the possibility that the IRS may use social
media at the examination and collections level, a recent Tax Court decision reveals the first
known example of IRS Counsel using a social media post as evidence contradicting the
petitioner’s filing position. James Creech, Oversharing on Social Media Reaches the Tax
Court, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Sept. 3, 2020) (citing Brzyski v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.
Op. 2020-25 (Aug. 27, 2020)), https://procedurallytaxing.com/oversharing-on-social-media
-reaches-the-tax-court/ [https://perma.cc/S99C-3B48].
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individuals consent knowingly as a matter of convenience. In other
instances, individuals are unaware they are being surveilled. The
motivations for tracking individuals and collecting such data are varied,
with rationales ranging from national security to marketing of
consumer products and many things in between.
Section I.A first discusses some of the ways in which government
agencies other than the IRS use technology to categorize or identify
behaviors, and it then provides examples of how private third parties
do so, including as a service to other individuals and, in some cases,
the person being surveilled. Section I.A of the Article raises questions
more than it provides answers: Where are we as a society with respect
to privacy norms, and what is our comfort level with technological
tracking? Under what circumstances do Americans seem to find it
acceptable to sacrifice privacy (whether their own or that of others) as
a means to achieve law enforcement, safety, or convenience? The
examples used herein are intended to set a stage for how the public at
large might feel about the IRS engaging in data mining for tax
enforcement purposes.
Section I.B addresses notions of tax and privacy, reflecting on how
the IRS has historically used publicly available information and
imagining how the use of social media mining may change or build
upon that use. The RFI reveals that the IRS is currently researching
third-party options for machine-driven data mining on publicly
available data.23 When asked whether the government was interested
in leveraging artificial intelligence-based technology to interpret text
and image-based information on social media, the IRS responded that
it “is open to any viable solution that fits our needs.”24 Thus, this
Article imagines a variety of possibilities that might flow once the IRS
opens the Pandora’s box that is social media.
A. Is Our Collective Notion of Privacy Slowly Changing? Examples
Outside the Realm of Tax Administration
As technology evolves, so too do norms and expectations. Public
agencies and private companies alike use artificial intelligence, or AI,
for a variety of predictive purposes. In some instances, predictive
screening techniques may be employed by both government agencies
and private industry in pursuit of the same goals, either in partnership
23

IRS RFI, supra note 2.
IRS, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, NO. 2032H8-RFI-MEDIA, ANSWER 31, IRS
SUPPLIED RESPONSES TO VENDOR QUESTIONS (on file with author).
24
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or in parallel. For example, both the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs and Facebook have created predictive tools for suicide
screening and prevention.25 The use of artificial intelligence by
government agencies may have different policy or privacy implications
than the use by private companies, but there also may be overlap. With
its RFI, the IRS signals an intention to partner with private industry.
Thus, in thinking about how the IRS may use social media to mine for
data, it is helpful to consider analogies drawn both from other
government agencies and from private companies.
1. Government Agency Use of Social Media Mining and Big Data
Federal and state government agencies engage in data mining in a
variety of ways and for a whole host of purposes.26 In their article
addressing the IRS big data analytics program, Kimberly Houser and
Debra Sanders reference a Senate report, noting that as of 2007 there
were 52 different federal agencies using at least 199 different operating
or planned data mining programs, including the IRS.27 Many of these
programs involved counterterrorism and national security but also
included efforts to improve agency service or performance, analyze
scientific and research information, manage human resources, and
detect fraud, waste, and abuse.28
Government data mining fits within, or perhaps couples with, a
larger trend of using automation to facilitate the administration of
25 Mason Marks, Artificial Intelligence-Based Suicide Prediction, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH.
SPECIAL ISSUE 98, 102 (2019). Marks divides the types of AI tools used for suicide
screening into two categories: “medical suicide prediction,” which is undertaken within the
healthcare system and involves the use of patient medical records, and “social suicide
prediction,” which refers to tech companies scrutinizing data, including social media data.
Id. at 104–05. Medical suicide prevention is subject to various regulatory regimes that
govern the healthcare industry, including but not limited to the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act. Id. at 105. Marks explains that the social suicide prevention is more
controversial in that it lacks accountability and transparency. Id. at 109. As a government
agency, Veterans Affairs is able to engage in both types of categories of suicide prevention
screenings, medical and social. Id. at 105. Tech companies, on the other hand, do not have
access to medical records due to privacy laws, and engage only in social suicide prevention
screenings. Id. at 107.
26 As Houser and Sanders note, data mining can be predictive (meaning it analyzes and
extrapolates data to make predictions about unavailable data) or descriptive (meaning it
“summarizes properties of the data set”). Houser & Sanders, supra note 14, at 824.
27 Id. at 825; Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy Implications of Government
Data Mining Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1
(2007).
28 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO 04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A
WIDE RANGE OF USES 8 (2004).
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social services to the public.29 While efficient, automation also has
identifiable downsides for individuals. In her book Automating
Inequality, Virginia Eubanks provides alarming examples of how
automated systems, ranking algorithms, and predictive risk models
affect the lives of the poor and working-class communities, including
individuals with respect to their use of various public services.30
Eubanks provides three in-depth case studies in her book: automation
of state welfare eligibility, an electronic registry of unhoused
individuals, and a risk model created to predict which children might
become victims of child abuse or neglect.31 Eubanks notes that
technologies are being integrated into social services “at a breathtaking
pace, with little or no political discussion about their impacts,” and she
observes ways in which they “intensif[y] discrimination” and
disproportionately affect low-income communities.32 Eubanks notes
that this digital trend is a modern continuation of the centuries-old ways
in which the poor and working class are surveilled and stigmatized for
being poor; she refers to this as the “digital poorhouse.”33
Other scholars have identified similar concerns about the link
between poverty and privacy. Using empirical data from a survey of
low-income individuals, Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy,
and Alice Marwick developed case studies of how big data tracking
(including social media tracking) poses risks to the poor in the context
of employment, access to higher education, and policing.34
These observations by Eubanks, as well as Madden and her
coauthors, reinforce my concern that low-income taxpayers may find
themselves under disproportionate scrutiny relative to other taxpayers.
As I describe in Section I.B, the IRS’s use of automated examination
29 For a discussion envisioning how regulators might use big data to personalize or
individualize outcomes, see Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield & Scott Duke
Kominers, To Thine Own Self Be True? Incentive Problems in Personalized Law, 62 WM.
& MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
30 VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 9 (2018) (“Digital tracking and decision-making systems
have become routine in policing, political forecasting, marketing, credit reporting, criminal
sentencing, business management, finance, and the administration of public programs.”).
31 Id. at 10.
32 Id. at 11–12.
33 Id. at 12.
34 Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, and
Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerability for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 54
(2017). “In each setting, low-income Americans face not only adverse inferences drawn
based on their personally identifiable information (which often is erroneous), but also those
drawn from their social media and demographic networks.” Id. at 124.
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techniques already disproportionately impacts the low-income
taxpayer population.35 Further exacerbating my concern, social science
research has found that lower-income individuals are “comparatively
unlikely to restrict their social media activity’s visibility via privacy
settings and are less hesitant to share sensitive information online.”36
Thus the very nature of their social media use makes them vulnerable
to disproportionate scrutiny.
Inherent in concerns about the low-income populations is a concern
about how these enforcement practices may impact taxpayers of
different races. Scholars such as Dorothy Brown, Palma Joy Strand,
Nicholas Mirkay, and Francine Lipman have identified structural ways
in which income inequality and wealth inequality are racialized and
how tax structures perpetuate or exacerbate these inequalities.37
Ideally, the use of artificial intelligence and technology would be used
to reduce inequality.38 However, much like humans, algorithms are
susceptible to bias.39 Data privacy scholar Margaret Hu has argued that
“algorithmically anchored” screening protocols are reminiscent of Jim
Crow laws: the protocols may present on the front end as facially
neutral while the results “may in fact have a disparate impact on
traditionally protected classes.”40 Information studies scholar Safiya
35 I have also addressed this phenomenon in my previous scholarship. See Michelle Lyon
Drumbl, Those Who Know, Those Who Don’t, and Those Who Know Better: Balancing
Complexity, Sophistication, and Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 113, 135
(2013) (examining and rethinking the application of the accuracy-related penalty to
unsophisticated and low-income taxpayers, particularly in the context of complex provisions
granting social benefits, such as the EITC).
36 Spencer Headworth, Getting to Know You: Welfare Fraud Investigation and the
Appropriation of Social Ties, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 171, 189 (2019) (citing Madden et al., supra
note 34).
37 DOROTHY BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH 19–21 (2021) (describing how the
persistent and widening black-white wealth gap is related to tax policy); see also Palma Joy
Strand & Nicholas A. Mirkay, Racialized Tax Inequity: Wealth, Racism, and the U.S. System
of Taxation, 15 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 265, 265 (2020); Francine J. Lipman, Nicholas A.
Mirkay & Palma Joy Strand, U.S. Tax Systems Need Anti-Racist Restructuring, 168 TAX
NOTES FED., Aug. 3, 2020, at 855, 856.
38 See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241,
1291 (2017) (positing that technology can be harnessed in ways that would deracialize
policing, or at least make a “significant step in the right direction.”).
39 Rumman Chowdhury & Narenda Mulani, Auditing Algorithms for Bias, HARV. BUS.
REV., Oct. 24, 2018; see also Kristian Lum, Limitations of Mitigating Judicial Bias with
Machine Learning, 1 NAT. HUM. BEHAV., No. 0141, June 26, 2017 (noting that judicial use
of risk assessment tools in criminal cases are only as objective as how they are trained
because machines will absorb the underlying human biases inherent in the data inputs),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-017-0141.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C2H-DHAZ].
40 Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 645 (2017). Hu
writes,
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Umoja Noble’s recent book, Algorithms of Oppression, provides
compelling examples of how algorithmic search engines discriminate
against people of color, particularly women, and reinforce negative
race and gender stereotypes.41
Privacy experts express concern over many different ways in which
government agencies use cutting-edge technology and artificial
intelligence—not just social media—as surveillance tools,42 and the
potential negative consequences to the public.43 As one example,
without knowledge or consent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agencies are using
facial recognition software to scan state driver’s license databases as a
“routine investigative tool.”44 While the use of this has grown over
time, a 2019 report revealed that facial recognition software
Artificial intelligence and algorithms are not usually perceived as resulting in
discrimination. In fact, they may appear to be equality-compliant or even equalityenhancing in that algorithmic screening and vetting can be applied equally across
entire populations and subpopulations. Screening and classification systems,
however, even when facially neutral and algorithmically based, can lead to
profound constitutional challenges.
Id. at 650.
41 SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES
REINFORCE RACISM 17–18 (2018). As one of many examples, Noble describes her surprise
when a Google search on her own computer using the term “black girls” retrieved results
filled with pornography, despite the fact that her individual search history included
engagement with Black feminist texts, videos, and books. Id.
42 Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1736, 1744 (2015) (explaining
how certain government programs screen the public through big data protocols to create a
class of big data blacklisted individuals) (“Specifically, [Hu’s article] explains how, for
example, matches and mismatches in big data systems can lead to inferential guilt that can
directly or indirectly categorize individuals as administratively ‘guilty until proven
innocent’ by virtue of digitally generated suspicion.”).
43 Of airport facial scanning for security screening, technology columnist Geoffrey
A. Fowler writes, “This has all the makings of a convenience trap. That’s how privacyinvading technology—the stuff of China’s police state—creeps into American life.”
Geoffrey A. Fowler, Don’t Smile for Surveillance: Why Airport Face Scans Are a Privacy
Trap, WASH. POST (June 10, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology
/2019/06/10/your-face-is-now-your-boarding-pass-thats-problem/ [https://perma.cc/B63F
-MS44]; see also Shea Swauger, Software That Monitors Students During Tests Perpetuates
Inequality and Violates Their Privacy, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www
.technologyreview.com/2020/08/07/1006132/software-algorithms-proctoring-online-tests
-ai-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/R8BB-QWZC] (describing how algorithmic proctoring of
online exams, which includes a facial recognition component, can result in racial and gender
biases).
44 Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos Are a Gold Mine
for Facial-Recognition Searches, WASH. POST (July 7, 2019, 12:54 PM), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-drivers-license-photos-are
-gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches/ [https://perma.cc/Z3KL-4R2V].
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misidentified people of color more frequently than white people and
misidentified women more frequently than men.45 In what has been
described as a first known case (and a terrifyingly dystopian one at
that), a Black man in Detroit was wrongfully arrested and detained for
thirty hours based on an erroneous match from a facial recognition
algorithm.46 Ironically, social media could have helped in this case: the
man later realized he could have used his Instagram account to provide
an alibi by showing he was elsewhere at the time the crime was
committed.47 As a result of concerns about discrimination and the
potential for false positives, a handful of localities have banned the use
of such technology.48 In the wake of nationwide protests of police
brutality following the killing of George Floyd, Amazon announced a
one-year moratorium on the police use of Rekognition, the company’s
facial recognition technology,49 and IBM announced that it “firmly
opposes and will not condone” the use of such technology “for mass

45 Drew Harwell, Federal Study Confirms Racial Bias of Many Facial-Recognition
Systems, Casts Doubt on Their Expanding Use, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2019, 3:43 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/19/federal-study-confirms-racial
-bias-many-facial-recognition-systems-casts-doubt-their-expanding-use/ [https://perma.cc
/B3CR-DM5X] (“The National Institute of Standards and Technology, the federal
laboratory known as NIST that develops standards for new technology, found ‘empirical
evidence’ that most of the facial-recognition algorithms exhibit ‘demographic differentials’
that can worsen their accuracy based on a person’s age, gender or race.”); see also Natasha
Singer & Cade Metz, Many Facial-Recognition Systems Are Biased, Says U.S. Study, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/technology/facial-recognition
-bias.html [https://perma.cc/4QB4-69FL] (“The systems falsely identified AfricanAmerican and Asian faces 10 times to 100 times more than Caucasian faces . . . [a]nd falsely
identified older adults up to 10 times more than middle-aged adults.”).
46 Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https:
//www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html [https://perma
.cc/L9D3-TDZZ]. While referring to this as the first known case of its kind, the article quotes
Clare Garvie, a lawyer from the Georgetown University Center on Privacy and Technology
who has written about concerns with facial recognition technology: “I strongly suspect this
is not the first case to misidentify someone to arrest them for a crime they didn’t commit.
This is just the first time we know about it.” Id.
47 Id. In the proposals I set forth in Section II.C, I suggest the IRS might restrict its use
of social media mining to constructive purposes, such as when the taxpayer requests it to
resolve a dispute.
48 Harwell, supra note 45 (stating that San Francisco and Oakland in California, and
Somerville and Brookline in Massachusetts, passed bans in 2019 on facial recognition use
by public officials, and the State of California banned the software’s use in police body
cameras).
49 Jay Greene, Amazon Bans Police Use of Its Facial-Recognition Technology for a
Year, WASH. POST (June 10, 2020, 5:31 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology
/2020/06/10/amazon-rekognition-police/ [https://perma.cc/S38P-A2K8].
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surveillance, racial profiling, [or] violations of basic human rights and
freedoms.”50
As to the appropriateness of government agencies using big data
mining techniques, one might also draw a logistical distinction between
civil and criminal investigations. One might more readily support the
use of artificial intelligence, social media mining, and digital
surveillance to investigate a crime, and I address this distinction in
Section I.B. In some cases, a warrant may be required as a procedural
safeguard prior to a search, but Fourth Amendment protections
generally do not extend to government agents gathering information on
social media.51 In this regard, social media use is similar to the
countless ways in which we are all being monitored daily without a
warrant: by security cameras in stores, by red-light cameras,52 and by
email providers and internet servers.
In many respects, we consensually (if unthinkingly) sacrifice our
own privacy any time we leave the house.53 How, then, can anyone
reasonably expect to have privacy rights in any of the information they
post on Twitter, Instagram, or Facebook? It is true that those platforms
offer a sliding continuum of privacy options; for example, one can
choose to share Facebook posts only with those they have “friended”
on Facebook. That said, we obviously lose control of information the
instant we publish it even to a limited audience; for example, most
people are cognizant that a private email or text sent to a friend, or a
screenshot thereof, can be easily forwarded to an unlimited number of
50 BBC News, IBM Abandons ‘Biased’ Facial Recognition Tech, BBC (June 9, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52978191 [https://perma.cc/6QZ6-K75R].
51 See, e.g., United States v. Gatson, No. 13-705, 2014 WL 7182275, at *22 (D.N.J. Dec.
16, 2014) (holding that an undercover operation in which law enforcement created an
undercover Instagram account and “friended” the suspect in order to view photos and other
information that he posted to his account did not require a warrant). For a comprehensive
discussion of privacy rights and social media posts, including a summary of Gatson and
other relevant caselaw, see Brian Mund, Social Media Searches and the Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 238, 240 (2018) (“An exploration of the
extant case law shows that social media users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
their social media postings—even if users communicate their information behind passwordprotected pages.”).
52 I. Bennett Capers cites red-light cameras and other technological innovations, coupled
with access to big data, as other possible ways to make “policing more transparent,
accountable, and egalitarian.” I. Bennet Capers, Techno-Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
495, 499 (2018).
53 See Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 248
(2008) (“[For example,] a person would have to be a hermit to be able to function in our
society without voluntarily disclosing a vast amount of personal information to a vast array
of public and private demanders.”).
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other people. And people, even those not on social media themselves,
have no control at all over what others may post about them.
In comparing the IRS to other government agencies, perhaps the
most useful analogy would be to those agencies that administer social
welfare benefits, such as the Social Security Administration and state
departments of social services. I draw upon these examples in particular
because Congress has chosen to use the IRS, and the tax filing process,
to administer and deliver a number of social benefits to the public.54
Most notable of these benefits is the earned income tax credit (EITC),
a refundable tax credit paid to approximately 25 million low-income
families each year as part of their income tax refund.55 Lawrence
Zelenak has aptly described the EITC as “a welfare program that
happens to be administered through the tax system”56 while also
suggesting that because it is housed in the Internal Revenue Code, there
is a higher tolerance for EITC overpayments than for general welfare
overpayments.57
Unlike the EITC, for which claimants self-certify, more traditional
welfare benefits such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP),58 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) are subject to
verification procedures before the benefits are awarded. In addition,
recipients of these benefits are also subject to investigation if fraud is
suspected during or after receipt of the benefit.59
This use of social media mining for investigating welfare fraud
appears to be widespread among state and local agencies, in particular

54 Over time, these benefits have included income-based refundable credits to working
families, as well as expenditure-based refundable credits such as the First-Time Homebuyer
Credit, the Adoption Tax Credit, the Premium Tax Credit, and a variety of education credits.
Drumbl, Those Who Know, supra note 35, at 119–39.
55 EITC Fast Facts, IRS, https://www.eitc.irs.gov/partner-toolkit/basic-marketing
-communication-materials/eitc-fast-facts/eitc-fast-facts [https://perma.cc/MC72-CADU].
56 Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Credit,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1869 (2005). Zelenak distinguishes the EITC from other welfare
programs, such as SNAP and TANF, because the EITC is predicated on earned income.
57 Id. at 1874.
58 SNAP is the program formerly known as Food Stamps. U.S. GOV’T ACCT. OFF., GAO
14-641, SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: ENHANCED DETECTION
TOOLS AND REPORTING COULD IMPROVE EFFORTS TO COMBAT RECIPIENT FRAUD, at 3
(2014) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM].
59 See Headworth, supra note 36, at 171 (“[F]ederal law requires state governments to
maintain dedicated fraud control units . . . . These units are busy [and] primarily focus [on
SNAP.]”).
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for enforcement of SNAP eligibility.60 The Social Security
Administration also has publicly acknowledged that its adjudicators
use social media in evaluating cases and has stated it will consider
expanding such use.61
Sociologist Spencer Headworth describes how SNAP investigators
manually search social media by viewing publicly available posts to
gather information about household circumstances, such as who lives
in the household, relationship status, and vacation photos.62 Some
fraud investigations arise from social media posts that are less subtle:
Washington State Department of Social and Health Services fraud
investigators came across a social media post offering to trade “great
organic marijuana” for an EBT card, leading to an arrest of an
individual on both food benefit trafficking and drug charges.63 In other
cases, social media leads originate from outside the agency: in
Pennsylvania, a woman who offered on Facebook to trade her EBT
card for cash was arrested after a member of the public tipped off the
state’s fraud unit.64
60 See, e.g., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 58
(reviewing fraud detection tools used in eleven states, including both automated and manual
monitoring of social media).
61 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., BUDGET ESTIMATES AND RELATED INFORMATION: FY 2020,
https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY20Files/2020BO_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH24-TCDY].
The Budget Overview states,
Currently, agency adjudicators use social media information to evaluate a
beneficiary’s symptoms when there is a [Cooperative Disability Investigation]
unit’s Report of Investigation that contains social media data corroborating the
investigative findings. In FY 2019, we are evaluating how social media could be
used by disability adjudicators in assessing the consistency and supportability of
evidence in a claimant’s case file.
Id. at 26; see also Sarah Min, Social Security May Use Your Facebook and Instagram Photos
to Nix Disability Claims, CBS NEWS (Mar. 21, 2019, 8:46 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/social-security-disability-benefits-your-facebook-instagram-posts-could-affect-your
-social-security-disability-claim/ [https://perma.cc/R34V-6VFJ].
62 Headworth, supra note 36, at 187–88. Of his interviews with fraud enforcement
workers, “[s]ome investigators described Facebook as their most valuable tool, and some
saw it as much less useful.” Id. at 188.
63 Press Release, Want to Trade EBT Card for Marijuana?, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF SOC.
& HEALTH SERVS. (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.dshs.wa.gov/sesa/office-communications
/media-release/want-trade-ebt-card-marijuana [https://perma.cc/55U5-U8N4]. Journalist
Kalena Thomhave took note of the way in which this specific press release “celebrated the
arrest” and how the press release “began ominously, ‘Note to would-be food benefits
traffickers. You’re being watched.’” Kalena Thomhave, Another Way to Police the Poor,
AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 11, 2019), https://prospect.org/economy/another-way-police-poor/
[https://perma.cc/RZV9-RCFV].
64 Press Release, OIG Charges Williamsport Woman with SNAP Trafficking for Selling
Her Food Stamp Benefits on Facebook. She Exchanged Benefits for Heroin, PA. OFF. OF
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Some state agencies have tried using software programs as an
automated tool for social media mining, with mixed results. The
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) provided
guidance to state agencies that wanted to set up such software to detect
benefit trafficking on social media sites.65 A U.S. Government
Accountability Office review of eleven states that experimented with
that approach reported that only one state found the automated
approach effective; the other states found the automated tools
impractical (either because of technical difficulties or because of the
high false positive rate) and preferred to devote their resources to
manual searches.66
As public policy student and freelance writer Kalena Thomhave
explains, social media investigations are a modern-day continuation of
the type of invasion of privacy endemic in welfare fraud
investigations.67 Thomhave attributes this to the “dichotomy between
those who are deserving and undeserving of public benefits, with the
government as arbiter, [which] lies at the foundation of the American
social safety net.”68 Though Thomhave’s remarks are directed at other
agencies that administer social benefits and do not mention the IRS,
one cannot ignore the fact that the EITC is part of the social safety net
for working families and the fact that the IRS has identified the EITC
as a targeted area of enforcement.69 This underscores my concern that
the IRS may set its social media sights on EITC recipients, a concern I
address in more detail in Section I.B.

INSPECTOR GEN. (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.media.pa.gov/Pages/inspector-general
-Details.aspx?newsid=35 [https://perma.cc/U93P-EXDC]. In Section II.B, I discuss the IRS
Whistleblower program, and I raise the question of whether the IRS should encourage the
public to report tax-related social media posts to the agency.
65 SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 58, at 23.
66 Id. at 17 (“Our testing found the recommended e-commerce monitoring tool less
effective than manual searches in detecting postings indicative of potential trafficking, and
we found the tool for monitoring social media to be impractical for states due to the volume
of irrelevant data.”).
67 Thomhave, supra note 63 (“[I]n the 1960s, welfare officials would regularly make
unannounced home visits (sometimes even ‘midnight raids’) to women receiving traditional
cash benefits to see if they lived in accordance with welfare eligibility rules.”). While not
referring specifically to social media mining, sociologist Spencer Headworth comments on
loss of privacy: “Making their lives transparent and legible to state agencies is one way the
poor pay for public assistance.” Headworth, supra note 36, at 172.
68 Thomhave, supra note 63 (emphasis in original).
69 See generally Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Beyond Polemics: Poverty, Taxes, and
Noncompliance, 14 EJOURNAL OF TAX RSCH. 253, 254 (2016) (identifying the high rate of
improper payments as one explanation of the high audit rate of EITC returns).
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2. Private Actor Use of Social Media Mining and Big Data
As noted, the use of artificial intelligence to screen individuals
extends beyond government agencies to the private sector, and some
companies are using social media algorithms as a screening tool, just
as the IRS seeks to do. One such online service company, Predictim,
ceased operation after it faced backlash for its methods.70 Predictim
had used AI to scan social media posts to assess babysitters’
personalities.71 This cyber-sleuthing service apparently appealed to
some anxious parents worried about leaving their child with an
unknown person; the company asserted that its algorithm could predict
such things as a sitter’s risk of drug use, tendency to bully, or even a
“bad attitude.”72 Predictim provided parents a risk rating based on the
results of the algorithm, but the company did not explain how the
algorithm arrived at that risk rating, and the results were not shared
with the potential babysitter.73
Though Predictim no longer offers this service, technology reporter
Drew Harwell observes that this type of technology is increasingly used
by companies in other types of hiring.74 Harwell notes that companies
use such methods in recruiting, hiring, and reviewing their workers,
“offering employers an unrivaled look at job candidates through a new
wave of invasive psychological assessment and surveillance.”75
Insurance companies are another class of private actor eager to
utilize information from social media, whether as a tool to determine
risk (and therefore premium rates) or to detect fraud.76 One
70 Predictim halted its service after backlash from media publicity, including a
Washington Post article, and after it was blocked by Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.
Drew Harwell, AI Start-Up That Scanned Babysitters Halts Launch Following Post Report,
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2018, 8:44 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology
/2018/12/14/ai-start-up-that-scanned-babysitters-halts-launch-following-post-report/ [https:
//perma.cc/TN2K-3EDD].
71 Drew Harwell, Wanted: The ‘Perfect Babysitter.’ Must Pass AI Scan for Respect
and Attitude, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2018, 8:50 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/technology/2018/11/16/wanted-perfect-babysitter-must-pass-ai-scan-respect-attitude/
[https://perma.cc/WTB2-N7GQ] (“[Predictim uses] language-processing algorithms and an
image-recognition software known as ‘computer vision’ to assess babysitters’ Facebook,
Twitter and Instagram posts for clues about their offline life.”).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. (“[Tech firms sell to employers] artificial-intelligence systems that analyze a
person’s speech, facial expressions and online history with promises of revealing the hidden
aspects of their private lives.”).
75 Id.
76 Jessica Baron, Life Insurers Can Use Social Media Posts to Determine Premiums, as
Long as They Don’t Discriminate, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2019, 1:26 PM), https://www.forbes
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commentator’s concern about insurance companies’ use of this practice
could be generalized as an overarching concern that any type of social
media mining can be potentially misleading.77 “If you’ve given up
smoking but have old photos with cigarette in hand (or repost one of
those popular Facebook Memories) how can a computer (or even an
underwriter with a lot of work to do) properly assess the context of a
photo?”78 Moreover, the image social media users cultivate online
often does not portray real life. In turn, this can limit the value of the
information obtained on social media and create time-consuming false
positives for the agency or company engaging in the search.79
People seem willing to tolerate and consent to privacy losses coupled
with technology (often in connection with their smartphone) for a host
of reasons, ranging from convenience to reassurance to rewards.
Consider also the example of summer sleep-away camps offering a
facial-recognition service, with an app sending the camper’s parents a
notification the moment their child’s photograph is uploaded to its
site.80 In 2019, the University of Alabama offered its students an
incentive to opt into cell phone–based location tracking because
football coach Nick Saban did not like that students were leaving the
stadium before games ended.81 The school created an app that students
could download on their smartphone to verify that they attended and
stayed at games for the full four quarters of the contest; those who did
so accumulated reward points, which would be used to provide
preferred access to tickets for championship games.82 During the first
.com/sites/jessicabaron/2019/02/04/life-insurers-can-use-social-media-posts-to-determine
-premiums/#7e18b19f23ce [https://perma.cc/SZW6-AFGW].
77 Id.
78 Id. In the context of life insurance, a cigarette represents a health risk for actuarial
purposes, as would certain hobbies such as skydiving or motorcycle riding. As other scholars
have noted, surveillance of poor people may focus on the use of cigarettes and alcohol, or
perhaps gambling. See EUBANKS, supra note 30, at 114 (discussing the example of Maine
Governor Paul LePage).
79 See discussion infra Section II.A.
80 Drew Harwell, As Summer Camps Turn on Facial Recognition, Parents Demand:
More Smiles, Please, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2019, 1:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/technology/2019/08/08/summer-camps-turn-facial-recognition-parents-demand-more
-smiles-please/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_facecamp-815pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory-ans
[https://perma.cc/UA47-7K3X].
81 Alex Scarborough, Bama Tracking Students to Check 4-Quarter Stays, ESPN
(Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/27608647/bama-tracking
-students-check-4-quarter-stays [https://perma.cc/9NPQ-RYXZ].
82 Billy Witz, Orwellabama? Crimson Tide Track Locations to Keep Students at Games,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/sports/alabama-tracking
-app.html [https://perma.cc/KM9X-AAS6] (“Greg Byrne, Alabama’s athletic director,
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game the incentive was available, so many students opted in that the
stadium’s network servers went down.83
For better or for worse, these sorts of commercial uses of data
mining and surveillance may have the effect of desensitizing people,
especially younger generations, to the loss of privacy. But what is it
that we should actually expect of our revenue agency, or of our federal
government? The next section explores the taxpayer “right to privacy”
and examines these issues through a tax-specific lens.
B. What Is a Taxpayer’s Right to Privacy?
In 2015, Congress codified a Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TBOR),
which the Taxpayer Advocate refers to as a list of ten fundamental
rights that taxpayers should be aware of when dealing with the IRS.84
Internal Revenue Code (the Code) § 7803(a)(3) provides, “In
discharging his duties, the Commissioner shall ensure that employees
of the Internal Revenue Service are familiar with and act in accord with
taxpayer rights as afforded by other provisions of this title,” and lists
the ten rights. Number seven on the list is “the right to privacy.”85
There is a separately enumerated taxpayer right to confidentiality
(number eight on the list), which addresses how and with whom the
IRS can share taxpayer information.86 By statutory implication, this
means the right to privacy is more than just a right to have one’s tax
information kept private from the public.
In his literature review of contemporary scholarship on tax and
privacy, Michael Hatfield categorizes the common characteristics that
frame the scholarly conversation about privacy.87 With one notable
exception that relates to low-income taxpayers and the privacy
sacrifices they make in exchange for refundable tax credits,88 Hatfield

said privacy concerns rarely came up when the program was being discussed with other
departments and student groups.”).
83 Id. Though not an Alabama fan or college student, my own teenage son told me he
would gladly consent to such tracking in order to secure College Football Playoff tickets.
84 I.R.C. § 7803; Taxpayer Bill of Rights, IRS (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.irs.gov
/taxpayer-bill-of-rights [https://perma.cc/UH33-R82A].
85 I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3)(G). I.R.C. § 6103 provides a detailed set of limitations on how
and when the agency may disclose taxpayer information.
86 I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3)(H).
87 Hatfield, supra note 14, at 604–10.
88 See Hayes Holderness, Taxing Privacy, 21 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 30–32
(2013) (expressing concern that the EITC, like other social welfare programs, imposes a
privacy burden on its recipients). As I discuss in the next section, this privacy burden
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finds that “privacy” scholarship focuses on protection from the
disclosure of information (i.e., what the IRS can do with information it
collects) rather than how we conceive of privacy limitations on the
collection of information.89 Hatfield describes the Code’s privacy
protections as “aim[ing] to maintain the confidentiality of taxpayer
information”90 while noting that the IRS has authority “to collect any
information relevant to the 145,000,000 individual income tax returns
filed each year.”91
If privacy and confidentiality are distinct rights and disclosure
rules primarily protect confidentiality, then what exactly is meant by
the “right to privacy?”92 At the time of this writing, there is no case
law interpreting § 7803(a)(3)(G),93 nor are there Treasury Regulations
providing formal administrative guidance on the various taxpayer
rights.94 Adam Thimmesch, a tax scholar who has written about
intersects with the fact that low-income taxpayers are disproportionately selected for audit
when they claim the EITC.
89 Hatfield, supra note 14, at 606; see also Adam B. Thimmesch, Tax Privacy?, 90
TEMP. L. REV. 375, 375 (2018) (“The academic literature addressing privacy in the context
of the U.S. tax system has generally discussed tax privacy as nothing more than a limited
right of confidentiality.”).
90 Hatfield, supra note 14, at 596. Hatfield points to § 6103, which generally provides
that tax return information shall be kept confidential. Id. at 598. Hatfield notes that the IRS
can collect any relevant information about taxpayers without probable cause of a crime or
suspicion of a misstatement or understatement of any kind. Id. at 580.
91 Id. at 580 (describing examples of cases in which the IRS reviewed medical records,
love letters, family dynamics, reading habits, and other details of people’s private lives).
Hatfield argues that tax scholarship “has not addressed the risks of excessive information
collection.” Id. at 610.
92 See Joshua P. Law, Balancing Efficient IRS Administration and Taxpayer Rights, 43
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 337, 348 (2019) (presenting a brief synopsis of the right to privacy
in a note that was published after Hatfield’s literature review) (“The [taxpayer’s] right to
privacy is ostensibly meant to guarantee taxpayers assurance that information about their
financial situation will not be intruded upon without due cause; however, the IRS currently
remains far from full compliance with this right.”).
93 Courts have stated that the Taxpayer Bill of Rights does not create any new rights. See
Moya v. Comm., 152 T.C. 182, 192 (2019) (“We think that the history of the IRS TBOR
makes clear that it accords taxpayers no rights they did not already possess.”); Facebook v.
IRS, No. 17-cv-06490-LB, 2018 WL 2215743, at *13 (N.D. Cal., May 14, 2018) (“The
statutory TBOR enacted as part of the 2015 PATH Act did not grant new enforceable
rights.”); Atl. Pac. Mgmt. Grp. v. Comm’r, 152 T.C. 330, 336 (2019) (“[S]ection 7803(a)(3)
itself does not confer any new rights on taxpayers; it merely lists ‘taxpayer rights as afforded
by other provisions of the Code.”).
94 Whether taxpayer rights are even enforceable is also an open question. See Alice G.
Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, The U.S. Taxpayer Bill of Rights: Window Dressing or
Expression of Justice?, 4 J. TAX ADMIN. 25, 27 (2018); Leandra Lederman, Is the Taxpayer
Bill of Rights Enforceable? (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 404, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365777
[https://perma.cc/WCE9
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privacy, refers to the TBOR’s statutory right to privacy as
“aspirational,” insofar as the standard is loose and subjective, and there
is no apparent remedy.95
The IRS defines the right to privacy as follows: “Taxpayers have the
right to expect that any IRS inquiry, examination, or enforcement
action will comply with the law and be no more intrusive than
necessary, and will respect all due process rights, including search and
seizure protections, and will provide, where applicable, a collection due
process hearing.”96 The IRS elaborates on the examination process as
follows:
The process of selecting a return for examination usually begins in
one of two ways. First, we use computer programs to identify returns
that may have incorrect amounts. These programs may be based on
information returns, such as Forms 1099 and W-2, on studies of past
examinations, or on certain issues identified by compliance projects.
Second, we use information from outside sources that indicates that
a return may have incorrect amounts. These sources may include
newspapers, public records, and individuals. If we determine that the
information is accurate and reliable, we may use it to select a return
for examination.97

As a starting point, then, query whether the IRS looking at public
social media accounts or other publicly available online information
would constitute a violation of a taxpayer’s right to privacy. It seems
intuitive that if an individual makes information about him or herself

-3PJ7]. But see T. Keith Fogg, Can the Taxpayer Bill of Rights Assist Your Clients?, 91
TEMP. L. REV. 705, 729 (2019) (arguing that the taxpayer’s right to privacy has a role in
examination cases with respect to a revenue agent seeking information from third parties,
and in collection cases with respect to the loss of privacy that results from the filing of a
notice of federal tax lien).
95 Thimmesch, supra note 89, at 392–93. Thimmesch observes that tax design must
weigh privacy interests, whether those are described in neutral or normative terms, against
potential information-collection harms (among other potential harms). Id. at 414. Building
on the work of Daniel Solove, Thimmesch notes that “information-collection harms occur
regardless of whether the information is collected through surveillance or through direct
interrogation” and “regardless of whether the information is collected by the government or
by a private actor.” Id. at 412 (citing Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 477, 491–92 (2006)).
96 IRS, PUBL’N NO. 1, YOUR RIGHTS AS A TAXPAYER (Sept. 2017) (emphasis added),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7WQ-EG5C]. The right to
confidentiality is described distinctly: “Taxpayers have the right to expect that any
information they provide to the IRS will not be disclosed unless authorized by the taxpayer
or by law.” Id.
97 Id.
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publicly available on such accounts, that individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to what has been posted.98
To reiterate, the primary concern of this Article is not whether the
IRS looking at social media violates the taxpayer’s right to privacy or
whether the IRS has the right to access and use this information for
enforcement purposes. I think the better question is whether, as a matter
of social policy, it is appropriate and desirable, or even cost-effective,
for the IRS to mine social media for civil enforcement purposes. As the
prior section explained, other government agencies can and do access
social media to investigate various types of benefits fraud. But most tax
noncompliance does not constitute “fraud.”
1. IRS Use of Data Analytics—Past and Future
The IRS has been using data analytics to address noncompliance
since long before Facebook and Instagram. Since the 1960s, the agency
has used something called Discriminant Function (DIF) scoring to
select returns for audit.99 The DIF score is a three-digit score assigned
by a series of algorithms and models, the contents of which are not
known outside the IRS.100 According to the IRS, the DIF “score rates
the potential for [tax liability] change, based on past IRS experience
with similar returns”—with a higher score more likely to be selected
for examination.101 The DIF is used as a screening tool, and a return
identified by a DIF score is manually classified by an “experienced
[IRS] examiner” in order to screen for significant issues “worthy of
exam.”102
The examination selection process has evolved over time through
the use of technology and automation, and over time these methods
have increased the efficiency of audits by using data to identify returns
98 Stacey Vanek Smith, When the IRS ‘Likes’ Your Facebook Update, MARKETPLACE
(Apr. 14, 2014) https://www.marketplace.org/2014/04/14/when-irs-likes-your-facebook
-update/ [https://perma.cc/KJQ9-UT38]. As tax scholar Edward Zelinsky remarked, “It’s
hard to believe that anybody who puts anything on Facebook has any legitimate expectation
of privacy.” Id.
99 See Carina Federico & Travis Thompson, Do IRS Computers Dream About Tax
Cheats? Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in Tax Enforcement and Compliance, J. TAX
PRAC. & PROC., Feb.–Mar. 2019, at 43, 45; TOM GREENAWAY & ALEXANDRA DESANTIS,
Taking the Mystery Out of Examinations—the Audit Process, in 1 EFFECTIVELY
REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENT BEFORE THE IRS 3-3 (Keith Fogg ed., 7th ed. 2018).
100 GREENAWAY & DESANTIS, supra note 99, at 5; see also IRM 4.1.5.3.3.1(1) (Sept.
21, 2020).
101 I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS-2006-10 (Jan. 2006).
102 IRM 4.1.5.3.3.1 (Sept. 21, 2020) (“Classifiers must use their skills, technical
expertise, local knowledge, and experience to identify hidden, as well as obvious, issues.”).
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more likely to be noncompliant.103 Other examples include the IRS
automated underreporter program that matches returns with third-party
reporting and the requirement implemented in 1987 to list identification
numbers of dependents.104 The IRS also screens individual income tax
returns using databases external to the agency to detect errors and
noncompliance. For example, returns claiming the EITC are screened
against the Dependent Database, which includes information from
external sources.105 These returns are scored according to certain
indicators, with a higher score suggesting a greater probability that a
taxpayer may not meet the credit’s residency, relationship, or age
eligibility requirements.106
While the public does not know how DIF scores are calculated, or
exactly what information is entered into the Dependent Database and
from which sources, it stands to reason that the possibilities of social
media data mining extend far beyond the traditional tools used for
return screening.
In their 2017 article, Kimberly Houser and Debra Sanders detail how
the IRS is already engaging in data mining of public and commercial
data pools, including social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram,
and Twitter, and using that information to run predictive algorithms.107
In addition to raising procedural and due process concerns about this
practice,108 Houser and Sanders also express a concern that the IRS’s
use of such algorithms may result in discrimination.109
103

See generally Houser & Sanders, supra note 14, at 828–33.
Id. at 829; see also James Alm et al., New Technologies and the Evolution of Tax
Compliance, 39 VA. TAX REV. 287, 312–13.
105 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT, 3 SPECIAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS 2020, at 5 n.26. (“The [Dependent Database] is a rule-based system
incorporating data within the IRS and information from external sources such as the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Social Security Administration.”); see
also IRM 4.19.14.1.1 (Dec. 7, 2017) (“Exam receives the majority of its EITC work from
the Dependent Database [] and Electronic Fraud Detection System.”).
106 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., supra note 105, at 27. The Dependent Database is
referenced in IRM 4.19.14.8 (Apr. 4, 2019), but most of the details are redacted.
107 Houser & Sanders, supra note 14, at 819–20. Houser and Sanders also detail other
types of privacy breaches not discussed in this Article, including how the ACLU has found
that the IRS purchased cell phone tracking technology and also discovered in 2013 that the
IRS policy permitted the reading of private emails without a warrant (it has since agreed to
stop doing so). Id. at 822–23.
108 Id. at 843 (identifying ways in which the IRS data collection and analytics practices
may violate the Administrative Procedures Act and/or due process protections).
109 Id. at 848–50 (“[Algorithms] may result in targeting certain groups based on the
associations created as the algorithm learns . . . . [And t]he New York Police Department
came under fire for its use of predictive analytics to focus its policing on certain
communities.”). But see generally I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology,
104
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My greatest concern, which Houser and Sanders do not specifically
raise, is that data mining of social media sources will disproportionately
impact low-income taxpayers. As I110 and others111 have highlighted
elsewhere, low-income taxpayers are already disproportionately in
the examination spotlight: in fiscal year 2018, the audit rate for all
individual taxpayers was 0.59%; when broken down by level of
adjusted gross income (AGI), a higher percentage of taxpayers with
AGI between $1 and $25,000 were audited (0.69%) than those with
AGI between $25,000 and $499,000.112 As the next section addresses,
audits of low-income taxpayers are typically time-consuming,
burdensome, and stressful. Taxpayers are asked to provide
documentation substantiating fact-intensive questions, such as who
lives in their household, what their relationship to those individuals is,
and how much support the taxpayer provides to those individuals.113
For low-income taxpayers, audits can pose an economic hardship for
those cases in which the IRS freezes the valuable refundable credit
portion of the refund until the audit is resolved.114

95 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2017) (advocating for the harnessing of surveillance technology to
deracialize policing and describing the necessary redistribution of privacy).
110 See MICHELLE LYON DRUMBL, TAX CREDITS FOR THE WORKING POOR (2019).
111 Kiel, supra note 19 (“[A]udits of the rich continue to plunge while those of the poor
hold steady, and the two audit rates are converging . . . . [EITC recipients] are audited at a
higher rate than all but the richest taxpayers.”).
112 I.R.S., PUB. NO. 55B, DATA BOOK: 2018, at 27 (May 2019). At AGI levels above
$500,000, the audit rate is higher, and the tiny number of the taxpayers at the highest end
are subject to a sharply higher rate: the audit rate of taxpayers with AGI between $500,000
and $1 million was 1.1%; taxpayers with AGI between $1 million and $5 million had an
audit rate of 2.21%; taxpayers with AGI between $5 million and $10 million faced an audit
rate of 4.21%, and 6.66% of taxpayers with AGI above $10 million were audited. Id. Note
that taxpayers who reported no AGI were also subject to a higher than average audit rate
(2.04%); this includes returns with losses, and a taxpayer with no AGI cannot claim EITC.
Id.
113 See I.R.C. §§ 2(b), 7703(b), 24, 32, 151 and accompanying Treasury Regulations
(setting forth the eligibility requirements for head of household filing status, marital status,
the child tax credit, the EITC, and the dependent exemption). These various eligibility
requirements overlap imperfectly and can be particularly complicated to apply to
multigenerational households and shared child custody situations. Examiners ask taxpayers
to prove residence of individuals through the use of such documents as school records,
medical or social service records, and court orders, if applicable. See, e.g., I.R.S. Form 886H-EIC (Oct. 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f886he.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2LNYAKZ].
114 See infra text accompanying note 120.
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2. Disproportionate Enforcement on Lower-Income Taxpayers, and
Implications for Taxpayer Privacy
The higher audit rate of these low-income taxpayers, relative to the
moderate-income taxpayers, is due in part to the fact that the IRS
prioritizes audits of returns claiming the EITC. In recent years, more
than one in three individual income tax returns selected for examination
involved an EITC claim.115 The EITC remains an enforcement priority
for the IRS even as other types of examinations have declined and even
though the overall number of returns with EITC claims has not
increased in recent years.116 The IRS has been subject to criticism for
shining the spotlight on the poor rather than the rich, as well as for the
demographic consequences of this enforcement strategy.117 A former
IRS economist who analyzed exam coverage data and estimated how it
breaks down by county and state reported that taxpayers in the rural
south are being audited at disproportionately high rates; according to
his estimates, the ten most-heavily audited counties in the United States
are disproportionately rural, low-income, and nonwhite.118
115 In 2018, 37% of audited returns were selected on the basis of an EITC claim. I.R.S.,
PUB. NO. 55B, supra note 112, at 23–26. Table 9a shows that 150,043,227 individual
income tax returns were filed; of this total, 892,187 were selected for audit, representing an
overall individual income tax audit rate of 0.59% for FY 2018. Id. Of the 892,187 returns
selected for audit, footnote 5 specifies that 330,359 (37%) were selected for audit on the
basis of an EITC claim. Id. at 126 n.5. See also Paul Kiel & Jesse Eisinger, Who’s
More Likely to Be Audited: A Person Making $20,000—or $400,000?, PROPUBLICA
(Dec. 12, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/earned-income-tax-credit-irsaudit-working-poor [https://perma.cc/HMP7-DDVR] (describing how EITC audits have
increased as a proportion of audits over a period of time in which IRS resources have been
reduced) (“[In FY 2016], the IRS audited 381,000 recipients of the EITC. That was 36
percent of all audits the IRS conducted, up from 33 percent in 2011, when the budget cuts
began.”).
116 See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2019-30-063, TRENDS
IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 15 (Sept. 9, 2019) (“Overall,
the number of tax returns claiming the [EITC] have not increased over the past five years.
At the same time, the number of examinations conducted by the [Wage & Investment]
Division for returns claiming the [EITC] have increased by 17 percent, from 282,665 in FY
2014 to 330,886 in FY 2018.”); see also George testimony, supra note 16, at 10 (noting that
the IRS added 290 additional tax examiner positions, that tax examiners were the only
position the IRS increased in 2018 and that correspondence examinations were the only
types of examinations that the IRS increased in 2018. In contrast, the IRS has decreased the
number of revenue agent positions; revenue agents conduct more complex examinations in
the field).
117 See, e.g., Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, Where in the U.S. Are You Most Likely
to Be Audited by the IRS?, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 1, 2019), https://projects.propublica.org
/graphics/eitc-audit [https://perma.cc/JZ7F-EJLL].
118 Kim M. Bloomquist, Regional Bias in IRS Audit Selection, 162 TAX NOTES 987
(Mar. 4, 2019) (discussing regional bias in audits for tax years 2012–2015 and highlighting
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The majority of all examinations, and EITC examinations in
particular, are correspondence examinations rather than in-person
audits.119 Correspondence examinations, as the name suggests, are
conducted through the mail. These examinations are highly automated
and are not overseen by one specific employee from start to finish. In
other words, the IRS uses an inefficient process to audit low-income
taxpayers on an issue with fact-intensive and complex eligibility
requirements. These audits are time-consuming to resolve, with the
result that refunds of thousands of dollars are often delayed for
months or longer.120 Further, these audits are often burdensome for
taxpayers.121 Yet the IRS has justified this disproportionate focus on
EITC claimants, citing resource constraints.122 At the same time, the
IRS has faced criticism for not doing more to pursue high-income
individuals who fail to file a tax return, even though pursuing nonfilers
is also cost-efficient because of automation and the use of third-party
information reporting.123
that rural Humphreys County, Mississippi, with a median annual household income of just
$26,000, had the highest rate of audit intensity, while also noting that the ten most heavily
audited counties are all in the rural south and that in 2017 the population of these ten counties
was 79% nonwhite (primarily African-American) according to the U.S. Census Bureau).
119 Seventy-one percent of examinations conducted in FY 2017 were correspondence
examinations, which is fairly typical. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 126 (2018), http://www.TaxpayerAdvocate.irs.gov/2018AnnualReport [https://
perma.cc/PWB6-Z3LM]. In the same year, approximately 72% of correspondence exams in
the Wage & Income Division were EITC exams. Id. at 128.
120 Most EITC exams occur prior to the issuance of the refund, with the result that the
refund is frozen and the taxpayer does not receive the EITC until the audit is concluded in
the taxpayer’s favor. Id. at 130, fig.1.8.3. Depending on household composition and income
level, these refunds are often thousands of dollars, making them significant relative to the
annual earned income of the household; low-income households rely on these refunds as a
critical anti-poverty safety net. See CONG. RSCH. SERV. REP., THE EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDIT (EITC): HOW IT WORKS AND WHO RECEIVES IT, R43805 (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43805.pdf [https://perma.cc/33EY-LTPX].
121 Id. at 133 (citing lower education levels, reliance on tax return preparers, and
language barriers as some of the challenges faced by EITC claimants upon audit).
122 Describing how the IRS audits approximately 300,000 EITC returns a year, the
agency’s website states, “EITC correspondence audits are the most efficient use of available
IRS examination resources with the average time to complete the audit of 5 hours per
return.” I.R.S. Update on Audits (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-update
-on-audits [https://perma.cc/WL6P-VLB4].
123 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2020-30-015, HIGH-INCOME
NONFILERS OWING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS ARE NOT BEING WORKED BY THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE (May 29, 2020) [hereinafter TREASURY INSPECTOR REPORT]. As the
TIGTA report notes, the intentional failure to file federal income tax returns is a crime.
Id. at 1. But see I.R.S. News Release IR-2020-34 (Feb. 19, 2020) (announcing that revenue
officers would increase in-person visits to taxpayers with income of more than $100,000
who did not file returns in 2018 or previous years). IRS Commissioner Charles Rettig
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It should be noted that while EITC claimants are disproportionately
in the IRS enforcement spotlight, recipients of this social benefit are in
many respects perceived to be treated with more dignity than recipients
of traditional welfare.124 Tax scholar Hayes Holderness describes the
EITC as “far less privacy-invasive than either TANF or SNAP,” as both
of those social benefit programs require precertification whereas the
EITC does not.125 Moreover, as Zelenak describes, it is rare for the IRS
to make a criminal referral for an individual EITC claimant; individuals
who wrongfully claim the EITC usually face only civil sanctions.126
3. Differing Policy Implications for the IRS Examination and
Collection Functions
The IRS RFI explicitly mentions the agency’s interest in using social
media research tools for “existing compliance cases” and mentions
collections as an end goal.127 Though it does not explicitly mention the
potential use in examinations, it is not implausible that the IRS would
consider using such tools to access social media in the context of both
examinations and collections.
While social media is a relatively new phenomenon, the IRS has
long navigated criticism and limitations on the appropriate balance
between taxpayer privacy and tax enforcement, including in
examinations. In the early 1990s, the IRS acknowledged it had
expanded the use of its “economic reality” investigations; whereas the
indirect method technique was previously used only in criminal cases
involving unfiled returns, the IRS extended its use of these so-called

emphasized this initiative as a priority in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee
in June 2020: “We continue working towards the goal of having a presence in every
neighborhood, on each type of tax issue and at every level of income, to ensure fairness
for all taxpayers.” 2020 Filing Season and COVID-19 Recovery: Before the S. Fin.
Comm., 116th Cong. (June 30, 2020) (Testimony of Charles P. Rettig, Commissioner,
Internal Revenue Service), https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/2020-filing-seasonand-irs-covid-19-recovery [https://perma.cc/T6GR-VS8G].
124 See generally SARAH HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., IT’S NOT LIKE I’M POOR (2015)
(recounting interviews with EITC recipients who speak to their perceptions); see also Sara
Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients
and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515 (2013).
125 Hayes Holderness, Taxing Privacy, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 30 (2013).
126 To the extent that the IRS makes criminal referrals in connection with the EITC, it is
most commonly in the context of tax return preparer fraud and promoters of fraudulent
schemes, rather than individual claimants. Zelenak, supra note 56, at 1891–92. One might
analogize return preparer fraud to social benefit trafficking.
127 IRS RFI, supra note 2.
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lifestyle audits to civil cases.128 Agents were trained to look for
economic signs that taxpayers were living beyond their means,
signaling possible unreported income.129 Tax professionals
complained that the audits were arbitrary, blurred the lines between
civil examinations and criminal investigations, and involved intrusions
into taxpayer privacy.130 Congress subsequently enacted § 7602(e),
which limited the circumstances under which the IRS could use this
technique.131 While § 7602(e) seemingly gave taxpayers a new defense
and even an opportunity to invoke a due process right, the statute
provides only that the IRS must show it had a “reasonable indication”
of a “likelihood” of unreported income. The relatively thin caselaw on
§ 7602(e) suggests that the IRS has had little trouble in meeting this
standard to justify its use of lifestyle audits when challenged by
taxpayers.132 In its internal legal advice interpreting § 7602(e), the
Office of Chief Counsel advised IRS revenue agents that they may
drive by a taxpayer’s house, or may conduct a Lexis search to ascertain
if the taxpayer purchased real estate in a year at issue, prior to having a
reasonable indication that there is a likelihood of unreported income.133
All this raises the question: If the IRS decides to pursue the use of
social media in both examinations and collections, should it develop
different policies and guidelines for the use of social media by these
distinct functions?

128 Albert B. Crenshaw, Tax Cheats Beware: The IRS Will Now Audit Lifestyles, WASH.
POST (Nov. 6, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1994/11/06/tax
-cheats-beware-the-irs-will-now-audit-lifestyles/1c220596-4ee3-4ec3-80cb-b06a0e443c32/
[https://perma.cc/T6GR-VS8G].
129 See, e.g., Philip R. Fink & Charles Gibson, Less Reason to Be Afraid?, CPA J. (June
1999), http://archives.cpajournal.com/1999/0699/features/f46699.html [https://perma.cc
/6NC9-UU2E].
130 Id.; Barbara Whitaker, Spending It; When the I.R.S. Agent Peeks Under the Mattress,
N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/28/business/spending-it
-when-the-irs-agent-peeks-under-the-mattress.html [https://perma.cc/J648-GH74].
131 I.R.C. § 7602(e) (“The Secretary shall not use financial status or economic reality
examination techniques to determine the existence of unreported income of any taxpayer
unless the Secretary has a reasonable indication that there is a likelihood of such unreported
income.”).
132 See, e.g., Hsu v. United States, No. 17-cv-06656 NC, 2018 WL 2234439 (N.D. Cal.
May 16, 2018); Mortland v. IRS, No. A-03-CA-115-SS, 2003 WL 21791249 (W.D. Tex.
June 24, 2003); United States v. Abramson-Schmeiler, No. 09-cr-00359-REB, 2010 WL
11537887 (D. Colo. Oct. 14, 2010); Chapin v. IRS Agent, No. 2:14-cv-538-EJL-REB, 2016
WL 383135 (D. Idaho Jan. 8, 2016).
133 I.R.S. Assoc. Chief Couns. Mem. 200101030 (Oct. 25, 2000) (concluding that these
specific practices would not constitute “an intrusion on a taxpayer”).
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The IRS examination function and the IRS collection function each
play a role in enforcement. As there are slight distinctions in their
mission, each function’s use of social media mining and big data
algorithms might have different implications.134 IRS policy states that,
in selecting returns for examination,
[t]he primary objective . . . is to promote the highest degree of
voluntary compliance on the part of taxpayers. This requires the
exercise of professional judgment in selecting sufficient returns of all
classes of returns in order to assure all taxpayers of equitable
consideration, in utilizing available experience and statistics
indicating the probability of substantial error, and in making the most
efficient use of examination staffing and other resources.135

The IRS has a separately stated set of policy considerations for
collections, which also emphasizes that “enforcement is a necessary
component of a voluntary assessment system.”136 Unlike in the
examination context, taxpayers have additional rights and protections
in the collections context, some of which are statutory137 and some of
which are a function of IRS policy.138 For example—and of critical
importance to low-income individuals—the IRS cannot pursue forced
collections through levy if doing so will create an economic hardship
for the taxpayer.139 In addition to statutory notice and due process
requirements, there are additional checks and balances in the collection
process. For example, by statute, the IRS cannot seize the taxpayer’s
principal residence without the approval of a U.S. district court judge
or magistrate.140
134 Recall that the RFI references using social media mining tools only with respect to
collections and explicitly mentions that it would limit the use to open cases. See supra note
2. I include both examination and collections in this discussion in light of Houser and
Sanders’ concerns about how the IRS is using its big data database. See Houser & Sanders,
supra note 14, at 870.
135 IRM 1.2.1.5.10 (June 1, 1974).
136 IRM 1.2.1.6.1 (August 18, 1994).
137 See I.R.C. §§ 6300–44, which includes notice and demand requirements and
collection due process rights related to the imposition of liens and levies.
138 See, e.g., IRM 5.11.7.2.1.1(2)(e) (Sept. 23, 2016); I.R.S., Dir. of Collection Inventory
Delivery and Selection Mem. SBSE-05-1015-0067 (Oct. 7, 2015) (notifying IRS Field
Collection agents of a policy decision to exclude social security disability insurance
payments from the automated levy program, even though § 6331(h) provides the IRS the
statutory authority to levy those benefits).
139 I.R.C. § 6343(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4) (as amended in 2005) (defining
economic hardship as a taxpayer being unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses).
140 I.R.C. § 6334(e). Section 6334(a)(13) additionally provides that any real property
used as the taxpayer’s residence is exempt if the amount of the levy does not exceed $5,000.
See also Treas. Reg. § 301.6334-1(d).
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The IRS Policy Statement on “Fairness and Integrity in Enforcement
and Collection” states three primary goals: (1) to ensure fairness to the
taxpaying public; (2) to ensure an equitable process for all taxpayers;
and (3) to ensure fairness to each taxpayer.141 The policy further
describes how it aims to ensure an equitable process: “[F]airness and
integrity are built into the foundation of our enforcement selection
processes. These processes operate under a comprehensive set of
checks and balances and safeguards to identify the highest potential
noncompliance, using scoring mechanisms, data driven algorithms,
third party information, whistleblowers and information provided by
the taxpayer.”142 We should expect the IRS to pursue collection where
necessary to promote compliance, but it must take measures to avoid
undue hardship to the taxpayer.143
As one way of balancing these enforcement goals with taxpayer
rights, Section II.C proposes that the IRS clarify its conception of the
taxpayer right to privacy to the public. The agency should be
transparent to the public about its use (if any) of social media, so that
taxpayers are on notice that the IRS is watching. It is hard, if not
impossible, to predict what compliance impact would result from
taxpayers knowing that the IRS is monitoring their social media.144
However, putting taxpayers on notice of this intention affords them
dignity.145

141

I.R.S. Policy Statement 1-236 (Oct. 24, 2016).
Id.
143 See, e.g., IRM 1.2.1.6.5 (July 10, 1959); IRM 1.2.1.6.14 (Nov. 19, 1980).
144 There is a rich literature on theories of tax compliance. See, e.g., Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax Compliance: Literature Review and
Recommendations for the IRS Regarding Individual Taxpayers, in NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOC., 2 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 138 (2007). One theory of tax compliance is economic
deterrence, which is the idea that taxpayers who perceive that the IRS is likely to catch tax
cheats will be deterred from cheating. However, studies suggest that deterrence is not the
strongest driver of tax compliance: other compliance motivations include social norms, tax
morale, trust in government, convenience, and reliance on tax preparers. Id.
145 Arguably, it also affords taxpayers who engage in noncompliance a warning to
cultivate their social media in a way that does not publicly tip off the IRS while continuing
to engage in such noncompliance. On the other hand, if everyone on social media cultivates
their online image with this in mind, with the effect that no one on social media brags about
cheating on their taxes, might this boost tax morale? These questions are worthy of research,
but beyond the scope of this Article.
142
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4. Differing Policy Implications for Civil Tax Enforcement and
Criminal Tax Enforcement
Just as there ought to be different considerations for examination and
collections, there should be different considerations in place for civil
proceedings and criminal investigations. As a policy matter, it may be
more justifiable for the IRS to engage in social media mining (along
with other use of artificial intelligence) to determine whether a criminal
act has been committed.146 The IRS Criminal Investigations unit has
far fewer employees than the civil enforcement side,147 and its smaller
workforce has a broader scope that includes not just tax fraud but also
money laundering and narcotics-related and counterterrorism-related
financial crimes.148 Don Fort, chief of the IRS Criminal Investigations
unit, has spoken publicly about how his office is using “advanced data
analytics to spot suspicious behavior,” specifically mentioning his
office was using data analytics to investigate noncompliance with
payroll tax laws.149 The need for this stems in part from the agency’s
decrease in staffing.150 Fort has also made public remarks about
unreported capital gains related to cryptocurrencies as an emerging area
of focus and said that there are whistleblower cases they are actively
working; he cited cryptocurrencies as an area of concern because of the
lack of transparency and visibility in those transactions.151

146 See generally Alm et al., supra note 104 (discussing ways that technology may both
improve and subvert tax compliance, including in the criminal tax context).
147 In fiscal year 2018, examinations and collections had 30,876 full-time equivalent
positions. IRS, DATA BOOK 2018 at 67, tbl.30 (2018). In contrast, there were 2,019 special
agent positions in the Criminal Investigations unit in fiscal year 2018. IRS, IRS:
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl
/2018_irs_criminal_investigation_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR3W-K5PA].
148 IRS, IRS: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2018).
149 Kristin Broughton, Tax Crime Enforcement Unit Relying More on Analytics to Spot
Crime, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2019, 5:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-crime
-enforcement-unit-relying-more-on-analytics-to-spot-crime-11560363826 [https://perma.cc
/JC7V-KHTW].
150 Id. (noting that the IRS Inspector General reports the IRS has 26% fewer special
agents than it did in 2012); see also Michael Cohn, IRS Criminal Investigation Leveraging
More Data Analytics, ACCT. TODAY (Nov. 14, 2018, 12:29 PM), https://www.accounting
today.com/news/irs-criminal-investigation-leveraging-more-data-analytics-to-probe-tax
-fraud [https://perma.cc/PW5S-B6VU] (“One reason why the division needed to rely so
much on data analytics was to make up for the shortage of special agents, while helping IRS
agents identify the cases that would have the most impact.”).
151 Broughton, supra note 149. The IRS Criminal Investigation unit is devoting
significant resources to cryptocurrency investigations. See Federico & Thompson, supra
note 99.
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Perhaps it is inevitable that the IRS will increasingly utilize artificial
intelligence techniques in criminal investigations, and perhaps the
public at large will not find the use of such techniques objectionable in
this context. If we embrace this as acceptable, where might this
ultimately take us? Will the IRS use facial recognition techniques to
track where taxpayers are going and to monitor their cash purchases?152
Where, as a society, do we want this to end? And do we want this
technology to be applied to all taxpayers and to all potential tax-related
issues, both big and small?153
II
PUNISHING THE UNSOPHISTICATED: PONDERING BRAGGADOCIO,
WHISTLEBLOWERS, AND THE QUEST TO CLOSE THE TAX GAP
This Article is not meant to deny or undermine the importance of tax
compliance or IRS enforcement efforts. The IRS estimates there is a
relatively high and steady rate of voluntary tax compliance, most
recently estimated at approximately 83.6%.154 The term “tax gap”
refers to the amount of tax not paid voluntarily and timely and refers to
three distinct types of noncompliance: nonfiling, underreporting, and
underpayment.155 The IRS uses noncompliance estimates and research
programs to inform its enforcement strategies. For example, there is a
well-established correlation between information reporting and
compliance, and there is a well-known compliance gap correlating with
the cash economy due to the lack of information reporting. Underlying
the goal of reducing the tax gap (as well as underlying the RFI) are

152 EUBANKS, supra note 30, at 7 (citing the example of Maine Governor Paul LePage
having his administration mine data and publicly release information about welfare
recipients who withdrew cash from ATMs in smoke shops, liquor stores, and out-of-state
locations).
153 According to TIGTA, “[i]n the past, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has focused
on the tax compliance of high-income individuals because their noncompliance can have a
significant corrosive effect on tax administration.” TREASURY INSPECTOR REPORT, supra
note 123, at 1. This is not to argue that the IRS should ignore small indiscretions, but given
the agency’s high focus on EITC enforcement, it ought to use technology to increase its
efforts at reducing high-dollar noncompliance. To see the proposal I set forth for this, see
my discussion in Section II.C.5.
154 IRS, PUBLICATION 1415, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP
ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, at 1 (2019). This figure is the voluntary
compliance rate, which is a measurement of the gross tax gap; the net compliance rate, which
includes amounts that are eventually paid, including through enforcement and collection
measures, is a slightly higher figure (85.8% in latest report).
155 Id. at 4.
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questions about how to most efficiently allocate limited resources in
maximizing tax compliance.
For some, it may be easy to shrug off a call to protect the privacy of
people who voluntarily make public the intimate (and often mundane)
details of their private life. Section II.A addresses that temptation and
raises examples of when and why it might be unfair, unwise, or
inefficient to incorporate social media mining for tax enforcement. A
distinction can and should be made between blatant public admissions
of fraudulent behavior, on the one hand, and subtleties perceived by
possibly discriminatory algorithms that may lead to significant false
positives. As to blatant admissions, Section II.B explores the question
of whistleblowers and whether the IRS should expressly encourage
third parties to report potential fraud based on social media postings.
This part then concludes in Section II.C with several suggested
policy proposals for the IRS, including a call for the IRS to clarify its
understanding of a taxpayer’s “right to privacy” for the public.
A. The Temptation to Disregard Individual Privacy Concerns
One response to this Article can be couched in the words of the
fictional character Forrest Gump: “Momma says stupid is as stupid
does.”156 In other words, people may intuitively respond to the IRS RFI
with a shoulder shrug: if taxpayers are foolish enough to get caught
doing something wrong, why is that necessarily bad? And if they are
bragging about illegal behavior publicly on the internet, why do they
deserve sympathy or leniency?157
As one unsympathetic example of internet braggadocio, consider
John McAfee, the British American businessman who founded the
McAfee Associates software company. McAfee, a self-described
Libertarian who unsuccessfully ran for President in 2016, is a
multimillionaire who has publicly stated that he is a nonfiler.158 I would
be surprised if this fact had been previously unknown to the IRS—
presumably at least some of his income is subject to third-party
156

FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1994).
Note that this dovetails with one of the major critiques of privacy rights: that “those
with nothing to hide have no reason to be concerned for privacy.” Hatfield, supra note 14,
at 591 (evoking arguments made by Judge Richard Posner and Catherine MacKinnon).
Several people I have spoken to about this Article had that reaction as well.
158 Brooker Crothers, John McAfee Is Running from U.S. Authorities – and Running for
President. On a Boat., FOX NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/john
-mcafee-is-running-from-u-s-authorities-and-running-for-president-on-a-boat [https://perma
.cc/WQ7D-LGQZ].
157
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information reporting,159 and the IRS would easily determine if no
return had been filed in a given year. Of course, it is the height of hubris
to brag about this publicly on Twitter, as McAfee did:160
I have not filed a tax return for 8 years. Why? 1: taxation is illegal.
2: I paid tens of millions already and received Jack Shit in services.
3. I’m done making money. I live off of cash from McAfee Inc. My
net income is negative. But i [sic] am a prime target for the IRS. Here
I am.

According to McAfee, he has told the IRS, “I am not filing a return,
I have no intention of doing so, come and find me.”161 Though the IRS
has not publicly confirmed this, McAfee claims that in January 2019
the IRS convened a grand jury to charge him, his wife, and four
campaign workers “with unspecified IRS crimes.”162
Another unsympathetic example of such public bluster is Rashia
Wilson, the self-declared “First Lady” and “Queen of Tax Fraud.”163
Wilson pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and one count of
aggravated identity theft in connection with charges that she filed false
federal income tax returns using fraudulently obtained social security
numbers.164 According to news reports, Wilson “taunted police by
posting photos of herself flashing stacks of cash”165 and posted
inflammatory statements online, including: “I’M RASHIA, THE
QUEEN OF IRS TAX FRAUD . . . I’m a millionaire for the record, so
if U think indicting me will B easy it won’t, I promise you!”166
159 The Internal Revenue Code imposes an information reporting requirement on certain
third-party payors. See I.R.C. § 6031. The list is voluminous and includes payors of rents,
royalties, wages, and sales or redemptions of securities. IRS research analysts have
consistently found a relationship between third-party information reporting and tax
compliance. See IRS, PUBLICATION 1415, supra note 154, at 13.
160 John McAfee (@officialmcafee), TWITTER (Jan. 3, 2019, 2:24 PM), https://twitter
.com/officialmcafee/status/1080953136985133062?s=21.
161 Crothers, supra note 158.
162 Id.
163 Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., Middle Dist. of Florida, “Queen of Tax Fraud”
Resentenced to 21 Years in Prison (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr
/queen-tax-fraud-resentenced-21-years-prison [https://perma.cc/E3CL-6RBA].
164 Wilson’s federal indictment included fifty-seven counts. See U.S. v. Wilson, 593 F.
App’x 942 (11th Cir. 2014), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 649 F. App’x 827 (11th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1064 (2017).
165 Susan Taylor Martin, From the ‘Tax Fraud Queen’ to the $980,000 Refund, Tampa
Bay Is a Hotbed of Tax Scammers, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www
.tampabay.com/business/from-the-tax-fraud-queen-to-the-980000-refund-tampa-bay-is-a
-hotbed-of-tax-scammers-20190222/ [https://perma.cc/QXM9-RYPD].
166 Robert W. Wood, Queen of Tax Fraud Gets 21 Year Prison Term — for the Second
Time, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2015, 1:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/03
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Neither McAfee nor Wilson is a low-income taxpayer who engaged
in a small amount of cheating or made a small mistake. Wilson was
sentenced to twenty-one years in her plea bargain and was ordered to
forfeit over $2,000,000 in stolen proceeds.167 McAfee was indicted in
October 2020 for tax evasion and willful failure to file tax returns.168
It is understandable that some would take a just deserts approach:
the idea that those who (like McAfee and Wilson) post things publicly
are inviting scrutiny and deserve what they get. Indeed, Americans
seem to enjoy stories of stupid criminals and human folly.169 These
stories proliferate on blogs, in news media, and in books.170 It stands
to reason, therefore, that people may enjoy stories of taxpayers “dumb”
enough to tip their tax hand to the IRS on social media.171 In my view,
our government agencies should resist the apparently very human urge
to laugh at human misjudgment. Our revenue agency ought to direct its
resources toward serious and systemic tax evasion and toward reducing
the tax gap.
I do not find McAfee or Wilson to be sympathetic examples either;
while both cases involve social media bragging, they run much deeper
than that. My privacy concerns do not extend to those who choose to
use social media to openly taunt the IRS or encourage the shirking of
/06/queen-of-tax-fraud-teasing-i-cant-be-caught-gets-21-years-prison-for-the-second-time
/#791bcc0a4d15 [https://perma.cc/PDD5-2ZZY].
167 Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., supra note 163.
168 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., John McAfee Indicted for Tax Evasion (Oct. 5,
2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/john-mcafee-indicted-tax-evasion [https://perma.cc
/6GWA-AFEB]. McAfee was arrested in Barcelona, Spain, as he was getting ready to board
a flight to Istanbul. Following his arrest, McAfee tweeted from prison: “I am charged with
tax fraud but my only crime is refusing to file returns - a misdemeanor. Fraud is lying on
your tax returns. How could I have lied if I have said nothing?” John McAfee
(@officialmcafee), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://twitter.com/officialmcafee
/status/1315004213638897665.
169 See, e.g., DARWIN AWARDS, http://darwinawards.com/rules/ [https://perma.cc/333W
-5QK9]. The Darwin Awards is a “humor” site and a community effort published by Wendy
Northcutt, who has compiled the stories into a book series titled “The Darwin Awards”
(Dutton Books). Id. At the time of this writing, there were four books in the series. The
Darwin Awards website states, “One should not be ashamed of laughing over the misfortune
of others.” Id.
170 See, e.g., TOM NICK COCOTOS, WEIRD BUT TRUE! STUPID CRIMINALS: 150
BRAINLESS BADDIES BUSTED, PLUS WACKY FACTS (2012); Andy Simmons & Priscilla
Torres, The Fifteen Unluckiest Dumb Criminals Ever, READER’S DIG. (Sept. 18, 2019),
http://www.rd.com/funny-stuff/dumb-criminals-unlucky/ [https://perma.cc/8BES-ZVDJ].
171 Similarly, the state of Washington made an example of the individual who publicly
posted an offer to trade marijuana for EBT cards. WASH. ST. DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH
SERVS., supra note 63. All three of these examples (McAfee, Wilson, and the EBT trader)
involve criminal acts rather than civil infractions.
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tax obligations. The IRS would ignore this behavior at its own peril, as
researchers find a strong link between tax compliance and tax
morale.172 If taxpayers view tax evasion taunts on social media and
believe that those individuals are “getting away with it,” that
undermines goals of tax compliance.173
Moreover, any criminal investigations of these two individuals
likely did not emanate from the internet bragging—rather, the bragging
(or taunting) seems to have come after the individuals were under
scrutiny by the authorities. My concerns are with much more subtle
social media users. For example, ordinary photos scanned by an
algorithm might prompt an audit; the algorithm might predict that,
based on these photos, an individual earns more money than he or she
reported, or that a child does not live in the taxpayer’s house for the
period required in connection with a particular credit that he or she
claimed.
In addition to my concern that the use of social media mining might
disproportionately harm low-income taxpayers, I wonder if the
agency’s choice to engage in social media mining might impact certain
personality types of taxpayers more than others. For example, it seems
that social media mining would likely locate individuals who engage
in bluster, targeting for scrutiny those who are loud, flashy, or
indiscreet, even though those individuals’ tax compliance may be no
better or worse than quiet individuals. Another concern is that it might
punish those who are cultivating a false image of themselves online.174
In a survey of 2000 British social media users, more than 75% of people
admitted to lying about themselves on Twitter and Facebook.175 There
is a rich body of social science literature examining how and why
172 See Kornhauser, supra note 144, at 139 (“Higher tax morale correlates with
higher tax compliance.”). Kornhauser’s article provides an extensive bibliography of tax
compliance literature.
173 Kornhauser notes that “[n]on-compliance among other taxpayers can decrease an
individual’s own tax morale and compliance.” Id. at 139–40 (citing Bruno S. Frey & Benno
Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 136 (2007)).
174 Houser and Sanders address the problem of potentially false data in their article. See
Houser & Sanders, supra note 14, at 841–42 (citing Minas Michikyan, Jessica Dennis &
Kaveri Subrahmanyam, Can You Guess Who I Am? Real, Ideal, and False Self-Presentation
on Facebook Among Emerging Adults¸ 3 EMERGING ADULTHOOD 55, 60 (2015)).
175 Lisa Vaas, Over 75% of People Lie on Social Media, NAKED SECURITY: SOPHOS
(Apr. 7, 2016), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/04/07/over-75-of-people-lie-on-social
-media/ [https://perma.cc/QB3T-T8EM] (finding men more likely to lie on social media than
women, with 43% of men polled admitting to fabricating facts about themselves); see also
Cortney S. Warren, How Honest Are People on Social Media?, PSYCH. TODAY (July
30, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/naked-truth/201807/how-honest-arepeople-social-media [https://perma.cc/WL8W-KFBC] (describing the same British survey).
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people lie online, as well as perceptions of how often other people
lie.176
This tendency for people to lie or exaggerate surely spans all ages,
but there appears to be a generational element to it as well. Social
scientists have found that young adults “with a less coherent sense of
the self and lower self-esteem reported presenting their false self on
Facebook to a greater extent.”177 Whether young or old, people may
have a wide variety of incentives and motivations to cultivate a false
online image. They may post pictures of someone else’s expensive car.
In some cases, a photo may not tell the full story. For example, a lowincome individual may post photos of a vacation at an expensive resort,
which might suggest to the IRS that the individual has significant
disposable income—but perhaps this individual’s parents paid for the
entire trip. Do we want an algorithm to point the IRS in these directions,
forcing individual taxpayers to prove that someone else took them
someplace expensive and paid their way?
In this regard, it is likely data mining will pick up false hits and
minor indiscretions that will direct the IRS down a path that is
either negligible (in the case of a low-income taxpayer who has
committed a relatively minor tax indiscretion, either intentionally or
unintentionally) or useless (in the case of those presenting a false image
or those posts that the algorithm misinterprets).178 Other government
agencies that engage in social media investigations have cited this as a
downside of using automated tools.179 Thus, it is foreseeable that the
IRS’s use of automated mining may necessitate the resource-intensive
manual review of many accounts that turn out to be false hits or not
worth pursuing; in that regard, it is possible that automation may not
be as cost-saving as one would assume. Kimberly Houser and Debra
Sanders raised similar concerns about the accuracy of IRS data mining,
noting, “big data results are based on correlation, not causation, and it
is inappropriate to judge people based on correlation; just because

176 See, e.g., Michelle Drouin et al., Why Do People Lie Online? “Because Everyone
Lies on the Internet,” 64 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 134 (2016) (examining online deception
across four different online venues, including social media).
177 Michikyan et al., supra note 174, at 55.
178 The IRS RFI mentions this possibility, though does not elaborate on how it would
prevent it: “the IRS will also be mindful that frequently information posted on social media
and the internet may be wrong or misleading.” IRS RFI, supra note 2.
179 See SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 58, at 23
(“[O]fficials in one state noted that the automated tools have placed an excessive demand
on staff because they had to sift through the many false-positive leads that were generated.”).
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people share characteristics or interests does not mean that they will
have similar tax compliance behavior.”180
Returning to the example of Predictim, the now-defunct online
service that used artificial intelligence screening to create a predictive
profile of potential babysitters, computer-generated scans sometimes
produce ambiguous results. “When one babysitter’s scan was flagged
for possible bullying behavior, the unnerved mother who requested it
said she couldn’t tell whether the software had spotted an old movie
quote, song lyric or other phrase as opposed to actual bullying
language.”181 Similarly, Facebook has worked to fine-tune its social
suicide prediction screening: Mason Marks cites the example of how in
its early efforts Facebook picked up false positives from likely benign
social media posts such as “Ugh, I have so much homework I just
wanna kill myself.”182
At the same time, the IRS’s use of social media data mining
presumably would spare those who are quiet—those who are
sophisticated enough to maintain online privacy, who know what not
to post, those who are so down-and-out that they lack access to the
internet, or those who lack the instinct to post about their lives on social
media. A sophisticated individual will follow the advice of privacy law
scholar Joshua Fairfield, who advises that one way for a device user to
protect one’s privacy is to “provide false information where possible,
to make the algorithms less sure.”183
I can imagine instances in which an algorithm might also target those
who maintain a social media presence but are silent as to certain aspects
of their lives. Imagine a taxpayer who has qualifying children she
claims for the EITC and child tax credit. What if she maintains an active
Facebook page but never posts pictures of her children? This is not a
farfetched scenario: many people choose not to post photos of their
children due to privacy concerns or simply because their children ask
them not to do so. Based on the absence of photos, would an algorithm
suggest that the IRS select this taxpayer’s return for examination and
require substantiation for the qualifying child claims, even if the
existing databases (e.g., the Dependent Database) had not prompted it?
180

Houser & Sanders, supra note 14, at 871.
Harwell, supra note 71.
182 Marks, supra note 25, at 109.
183 Joshua Fairfield, 7 Things I Teach My Kids About Privacy, MEDIUM (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://medium.com/@fairfieldj/7-things-i-teach-my-kids-about-privacy-24372552cde0
[https://perma.cc/5DTP-42T4] (explaining that, as device users, we lack the ability to protect
our data but can take certain steps to protect our privacy).
181
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Another concern is the proliferation of fake social media accounts,
including for nefarious purposes.184 There have been publicized cases
of criminals impersonating individuals on Facebook in order to scam
unsuspecting individuals.185 Would this affect the social media mining
algorithm, leading to time-consuming false positives?
These are but a few suggestions of how social media algorithms
might create red herrings for the IRS in many directions, directing
scarce resources to dead ends rather than prioritizing human analytical
work toward larger dollar cases. Are there other, more effective ways
to use social media as a tax compliance tool? Returning to the extreme
examples of internet braggadocio, the IRS Whistleblower Program
provides an example that might be instructive to draw upon in this
regard.
B. Whistleblowers: Should the IRS Encourage Social Media
Snitching, and Under What Circumstances?
Recall the story of the woman in Pennsylvania who brazenly posted
an offer on Facebook to trade her SNAP card for cash.186 Social media
was her downfall, but she wasn’t caught by an algorithm or even by an
agency employee conducting a manual search.187 Something oldfashioned happened: someone snitched on her.188 A member of the
public saw the post, recognized the illegal nature of it, and contacted
the agency to report it.189 This example underscores something about
human nature: if people are morally outraged by something, they will
speak up. Thus, it is possible that social media will serve as a tool for
184 See Arun Vishwanath, Habitual Facebook Use and Its Impact on Getting Deceived
on Social Media, 20 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 83 (2015) (describing how habitual
Facebook use may increase the user’s vulnerability to phishing attacks on social media
sites).
185 See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Facebook Connected Her to a Tattooed Soldier in Iraq. Or
So She Thought, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/28
/technology/facebook-military-scam.html [https://perma.cc/UR8E-PVWR] (“[There are]
two sides of a fraud that has flourished on Facebook and Instagram, where scammers
impersonate real American service members to cheat vulnerable and lonely women out of
their money.”).
186 Following the tip from a member of the public, investigators arrested Tanya Keenan
Mac after she traded her EBT card for heroin. Kristina Papa, Food Stamp Facebook Post
Leads to Another Arrest, WNEP (Apr. 4, 2017, 5:50 PM), https://www.wnep.com/article
/news/local/lycoming-county/food-stamp-facebook-post-leads-to-another-arrest/523-8c2dc
cca-b352-42bb-9e37-4eafa4fdf6d9 [https://perma.cc/Y49Y-972U].
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
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enforcement whether the IRS chooses to mine it or not. Not every
instance of internet braggadocio is as outrageous as the examples of
John McAfee and Rashia Wilson or even as overt as that of the woman
in Pennsylvania. Most social media leads will be subtler and may be
useful only in conjunction with other information known to the viewer.
In his 1996 article suggesting ways to improve public perceptions of
the tax system, Joshua Rosenberg proposed ways to encourage and
even financially incentivize the public to report tax avoidance to the
authorities, arguing that fostering communication (rather than
polarization) with the IRS may improve attitudes toward tax
compliance.190 Along those lines, perhaps it might be more appropriate
to leave social media monitoring to the public and not have the IRS
initiate it. In that framework, the IRS is not doing the frontline social
media mining, which eliminates the unwelcome “Big Brother” feeling
of the government monitoring your posts.
The IRS already has some mechanisms in place for members of the
public to report tax noncompliance. Anyone can report a “suspected tax
law violation” on IRS Form 3949-A, which can be submitted
anonymously.191 The form provides a place to report the name of the
alleged wrongdoer, and the informant can tick one or more of twenty
boxes to describe the alleged violations. These boxes range from very
common types of civil noncompliance (failure to file a return, failure
to pay tax, EITC, unreported income) to more serious criminal
allegations (narcotics income, kickback, organized crime, corruption).
In addition to this information referral form, which anyone can use
to report a variety of suspected misconduct, the IRS has a statutory
whistleblower program. Internal Revenue Code § 7623, as originally
enacted, was an informant claim program authorizing the Secretary of
Treasury to pay financial awards as necessary for “(1) detecting
underpayments of tax,” or “(2) detecting and bringing to trial and
punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or

190 Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How
We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155 (1996).
191 IRS, FORM 3949-A, INFORMATION REFERRAL (2016). IRS procedures for screening
these forms are described in the Internal Revenue Manual, though parts are redacted. IRM
3.28.2 (Aug. 1, 2020).
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conniving at the same.”192 Section 7623(b), added in 2006,193 created
a formalized whistleblower program, providing that a whistleblower
shall “receive as an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30
percent of the proceeds collected as a result of the action . . . or from
any settlement in response to such action,” with the amount of the
award determined based upon “the extent to which the individual
substantially contributed to such action.”194 The 2006 amendment also
mandated the creation of an IRS Whistleblower Office to implement
the program.195
Under the IRS Whistleblower Program, an award applies only in
cases in which (1) an individual taxpayer’s gross income exceeds
$200,000 in the year at issue; or (2) the proceeds in dispute exceed
$2,000,000.196 Thus, Congress designed the program to incentivize tips
or reports of significant evasion or of evasion by taxpayers with
significant income.
Notably, the award is decreased in cases “based principally on
information disclosed in certain public sources . . . .”197 This limitation

192 I.R.C. § 7623(a). Internal revenue informant laws have been in effect since 1867, but
the significant revisions that created the whistleblower program were enacted in 2006.
See IRS, History of the Whistleblower/Informant Program (June 18, 2020), https://www.irs
.gov/compliance/history-of-the-whistleblower-informant-program [https://perma.cc/8HF3
-HUY2].
193 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. A, tit. IV, § 406,
120 Stat. 2958.
194 I.R.C. § 7623(b).
195 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 § 406(b).
196 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(5). The most prominent IRS whistleblower is Bradley Birkenfeld,
the UBS banker who divulged information to the IRS about Swiss banking schemes that
amounted to criminal tax evasion. David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104
Million by I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/
business/whistle-blower-awarded-104-million-by-irs.html [https://perma.cc/Q37C-6GAB].
Birkenfeld, himself a subject of the criminal investigation and who served two and a half
years in prison for his role in the scheme, made use of the IRS Whistleblower Program and
received the largest ever award, $104 million. Id. The information he provided to the IRS
yielded a lot of fruit: thousands of names of U.S. offshore bank account owners were
provided to the IRS, and thousands of other offshore bank account holders voluntarily
disclosed their accounts as part of an amnesty program that resulted. Id. The IRS estimated
that Birkenfeld’s information “helped recover more than $5 billion in unpaid taxes.”As the
article notes, whistleblower awards constitute gross income, so the IRS ultimately receives
part of the award back in tax revenue. Id.
197 IRS, PUBLICATION 5241, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2019.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/3HSB-N2AE]; see also I.R.C. § 7623(b)(2). The award is also decreased when
the whistleblower “planned and initiated the actions” that led to the tax law violations. I.R.C.
§ 7623(b)(3).
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is likely to become relevant if a whistleblower’s basis for the claim is
information he or she saw on a taxpayer’s Facebook or Twitter page.
While most tips from social media would be unlikely to meet the
criteria of the formalized whistleblower program, the IRS has fixed a
general framework for individuals to report noncompliant taxpayers.
Instead of pursuing a third-party tool for social media mining, the IRS
could simply leave the online snooping to the public, and the agency
can follow its existing procedures in pursuing any social media-related
tips that are reported on Form 3949-A or whistleblower claims.
C. Proposals for Setting IRS Policies on Social Media Mining:
Balancing Modern Enforcement Techniques with a Taxpayer
Right to Privacy
1. The IRS Should Clarify Its Understanding of the Taxpayer “Right
to Privacy”
As a starting point, the IRS ought to define more clearly its
interpretation of a taxpayer’s right to privacy. Michael Hatfield’s
scholarship provides examples illustrating the breadth of personal
information that may be tax relevant.198 Hatfield warned that
technological advances, including the use of big data mining, would
undo the privacy protection previously afforded to individuals when
the IRS faced a structural inability to review all the information
available to it.199
Notions of privacy are rapidly changing. Perhaps it is not even
possible for the IRS to define its conceptualization of taxpayer privacy.
That would be a legitimate position—if that is the case, it ought to say
so explicitly. In part parroting the statutory language of § 7602(e), the
IRS website explanation of the taxpayer right to privacy states the
agency “should not seek intrusive and extraneous information about
your lifestyle during an audit if there is no reasonable sign that you

198 Hatfield, supra note 14, at 631 (referencing the potential tax relevance of sleeping
arrangements, marital discord, therapy sessions, and health and social club memberships,
among other things); see also Michael Hatfield, Taxation and Surveillance: An Agenda,
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 319, 321 (2015) (describing instances of how the IRS is entitled to
collect information about individuals’ hobbies, reading preferences, religious affiliation,
travel plans, weight and doctor’s recommendations about it, abortion, sterilization, or gender
identity disorder).
199 Hatfield, supra note 14, at 631–32 (“[G]iven how much personal information will be
covered by the coming technology and how much personal information is potentially tax
relevant, it is hard to have anything but a dystopian vision of this future . . . .”).
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have unreported income.”200 However, most of what is posted on social
media is extraneous to one’s income situation. If the IRS is routinely
surveilling social media at large (even if by algorithm as opposed to
manually), rather than making targeted searches after finding signs of
unreported income, then it is seemingly violating its own principle.
2. Increase Transparency of Audit Techniques
Relatedly, if the IRS does not believe that taxpayers have a right to
privacy in their social media posts, and if it intends to use automated
techniques to trawl all forms of social media for possible enforcement
leads, it ought to state that intention clearly and explicitly. At least then
the public will be on explicit notice that the IRS is watching their social
media. Just as posted signs warn motorists of traffic cameras on roads
or notify the public of security cameras at tourist sites and stores,
taxpayers should be on notice that the IRS is monitoring their social
media activity. Further, the IRS ought also to provide specifics as to its
methods: whether the mining is manual or automated; whether the
agency is searching indiscriminately or only with cause; whether it is
doing so in civil cases or only for criminal investigations; and whether
it is doing so in connection with examinations, collections, or both.
This information ought to be prominently displayed on the IRS
website. The IRS could undertake a public relations campaign to this
effect, using social media as its own tool for spreading the word to
taxpayers. If it wishes, it might even openly encourage people to report
one another when they see incriminating information on other people’s
social media. Imagine such a tweet from the IRS: “Do your patriotic
duty: retweet suspected tax noncompliance! #TaxGap @IRStaxpros
#taxcompliance.” If that is how the IRS wishes to operate, it should
make that known to the public so that people can proceed accordingly.
3. Limit Social Media Investigations to Manual Searches Rather than
Automated, and Define Limits in the Internal Revenue Manual
If the IRS pursues social media mining as part of its enforcement
strategy, it will face decision points in setting the contours. A critical
first question is to what extent the mining should be done by humans
as opposed to by algorithms. If the mining is done by algorithms, a

200 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 7: The Right to Privacy, IRS (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www
.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-7-the-right-to-privacy-0 [https://perma.cc/2CH5
-KR7D].
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second question is whether mining should be limited only to current
investigations or used more widely to cast the broadest possible net.
Software programs for data mining produce false positives and are
potentially discriminatory. Of course, the same risks are inherent in
humans performing manual searches on social media. But humans can
play a role in procedural protections, especially if trained in how to
conduct searches in a way that minimizes false positives. In the context
of whether the Social Security Administration should explore greater
use of social media in its investigatory work, Social Security
Commissioner Michael J. Astrue told members of Congress that, in his
view, professionally trained fraud investigators should be the ones
evaluating circumstantial evidence of fraud, not administrative law
judges or other employees: “Social media sites are not exactly clear and
reliable evidence . . . Facebook puts up phony websites under my name
all the time.”201
Additionally, humans face constraints that computers do not: for
one, they have only a limited number of work hours in the week.
Humans do not have time to engage in widespread social media mining
on a random basis, nor would it be cost efficient for them to do so.
Thus, it would be logical to limit employee use of manual searches to
the context of existing enforcement cases. This would be most
consistent with the limits imposed by § 7602(e), providing that the IRS
should not engage in broad fishing expeditions based solely on signs of
financial status but can conduct lifestyle audits once the agency finds
“a reasonable indication that there is a likelihood of such unreported
income.”202
Authorizing specially trained employees to undertake manual
searches of social media in preexisting enforcement cases would be
the least harmful alternative. There is a humanity to manuality that is
not inherent in automated searches: it opens the door to mercy and
201 Robert Pear, On Disability and on Facebook? Uncle Sam Wants to Watch What
You Post, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/us/politics
/social-security-disability-trump-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/BM7V-FA9D]. Pear quotes
Astrue’s remarks in the 2019 article; the remarks were made in 2012 while Astrue was
serving as Social Security Commissioner. In his testimony at the hearing, Astrue articulated
the possibility that angry ex-spouses may post false information on Facebook. The Social
Security Administration: Is It Meeting Its Responsibilities to Save Taxpayer Dollars
and Serve the Public?: S. Hearing 112-751 Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin., 112th
Cong. (2012) (statement of Hon. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security
Administration). He also expressed a concern that “[i]f you allow broad social media access
on government time, I think that becomes an enormous suck on productivity.” Id.
202 I.R.C. § 7602(e).
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discretion in the taxpayer’s favor. There is, however, still the risk of
employee bias with manual searches. If the IRS were to adopt this
technique, it ought to develop policies on when social media
investigations are appropriate and what types of evidence might be
probative. The IRS can incorporate these policies into the Internal
Revenue Manual. Most importantly, these tools ought not to be used to
unduly scrutinize poor people.
For example, with respect to collection enforcement, it may be
appropriate for an Offer Specialist to manually search social media
while verifying the financial statements that were made by the
applicant under penalties of perjury. Perhaps an Offer Specialist’s
findings should weigh adversely only if a material misrepresentation is
found and documented in writing in the file, and after the applicant has
had a chance to respond to specific questions about the information
viewed online. Imagine a manual social media search that appears to
uncover an asset of significant value not reported on the Offer in
Compromise financial statement: the Offer Specialist should be
allowed to make further inquiries and document the findings and the
applicant’s response as part of the administrative record. For example,
if the Specialist sees a photograph of the taxpayer wearing a very
expensive wristwatch that was not reported on the asset section of the
financial statement, it is reasonable that the Specialist be permitted to
ask the taxpayer about this. On the other hand, the Specialist should not
be permitted to make value-laden inquiries as to the applicant’s
expenses. For example, taxpayers submitting an Offer in Compromise
are permitted to use a standard expense dollar amount to account for
food, clothing, and certain other household items based on the size of
the household; the IRS policy is to permit the standard figure without
questioning the amount actually spent, and the taxpayer is not required
to substantiate the allowable standard figure.203 Therefore, if the
taxpayer has claimed the standard figure, the Offer Specialist should be
barred from asking the taxpayer to increase the offer’s dollar amount
on the basis that the taxpayer has been spotted on social media smoking
cigarettes, eating steak, or wearing designer-brand clothes.

203 See Collection Financial Standards, IRS (Nov. 19. 2020), https://www.irs.gov
/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/collection-financial-standards [https://perma
.cc/3TGE-JS9B].
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4. If Automated Social Media Mining Is Used, Implement Use of PreExamination Soft Letters to Nudge Taxpayers Detected by the
Algorithm
If the IRS proceeds with using social media mining, it should do so
as part of an announced compliance campaign. Rather than moving
straight to opening examinations based on results, as a first step, the
IRS should send selected taxpayers a “soft letter” as a nudge to improve
compliance. The idea behind such an initiative is to let taxpayers know
that the IRS is undertaking a new enforcement technique or enhancing
enforcement of a particular type. The IRS refers to these as
“educational letters,” and there is precedent for broad use of these
letters in targeted areas of suspected noncompliance. In recent years,
the IRS has sent soft letters to cryptocurrency holders,204 offshore
account holders,205 and taxpayers known to have engaged in specific
types of transactions that the IRS suspects might be abusive.206
The Taxpayer Advocate Service conducted a study in which it sent
educational letters to taxpayers whose returns were not selected for
examination, but nonetheless appeared to have erroneously claimed the
EITC on their 2014 tax return.207 The study found that the letters were
effective in improving compliance the following year in some
particular contexts, with taxpayers not making the same mistake the
next year.208 During her time as National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina
204 See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-132 (July 26, 2019). Taxpayer Advocate Erin
Collins recently criticized the scope of these letters, calling it “disturbing” that these letters
imposed “unreasonable burdens on [taxpayers] outside the protection of an examination.”
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 2021, at 80
(2020).
205 See, e.g., Kelly Phillips Erb, IRS to Target S Corporations, Foreign Disclosures in
New Campaigns, FORBES (July 24, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kelly
phillipserb/2019/07/24/irs-to-target-s-corporations-foreign-disclosures-in-new-campaigns
/#78f1f4313a38 [https://perma.cc/CE98-9U2H].
206 See, e.g., Jay Adkisson, IRS Sends Second Wave of Soft Letter Warnings to Certain
Captive Owners for Abusive Microcaptive Transactions, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2020, 9:48 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2020/08/08/irs-sends-second-wave-of-soft-letter
-warnings-to-certain-captive-owners-for-abusive-microcaptive-transactions/#7b14cd8713ee
[https://perma.cc/6746-857W].
207 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., STUDY OF SUBSEQUENT FILING BEHAVIOR OF
TAXPAYERS WHO CLAIMED EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS (EITC) APPARENTLY IN
ERROR AND WERE SENT AN EDUCATIONAL LETTER FROM THE NATIONAL TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, 2 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 32, 33 (2016).
208 Id. The study found the educational letters were particularly effective with respect to
educating taxpayers on the relationship requirement of the EITC but less effective with
respect to taxpayers who claimed a child that was also claimed by another taxpayer.
Extrapolating from the study, some types of noncompliance may be more easily corrected
by an educational letter than others. See also NTA Blog, EITC – How a Simple Educational
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Olson emphasized that, in order to be salient and effective, IRS letters
or notices should be specific in content and tailored to the most relevant
issues to the taxpayers.209 To be most effective, an educational letter in
the social media context should address the specific mistake that is
suspected, rather than be framed as a general reminder to comply with
taxes.
While I do not wish to see the IRS engage in widescale automated
social media mining, sending educational letters to taxpayers based
upon suspicious findings is a more reasonable first step than
immediately opening an examination. The letter should specifically
reference social media. Sending such a letter serves the goal of
transparency, as it puts the taxpayer on notice that the IRS is surveilling
their online activity and, ideally, will nudge the taxpayer to correct his
or her behavior.210
5. Sharply Define the Social Media Mining Criteria, Using It to
Target Only the Most Egregious Noncompliance
I find social media mining in tax enforcement cringeworthy at any
income level, and my first preference is to keep the IRS out of this
realm. However, if the IRS proceeds with this initiative, my alternative
preference is for the agency to set its sights either on the most egregious
types of tax noncompliance (regardless of income level) or on the
highest earners, who have been the subject of a declining audit rate in
the last decade.211

Letter Can Help Avert Noncompliance, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV. (Feb. 28, 2018), https:
//www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/ntablog-eitc-how-a-simple-educational-letter-can
-help-avert-noncompliance/ [https://perma.cc/BGA9-KAVM].
209 NTA Blog, The IRS Should Redesign Its Notices Using Psychological, Cognitive,
and Behavioral Science Insights to Protect Taxpayer Rights, Enhance Taxpayer
Understanding, and Reduce Taxpayer Burden, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV. (April 3, 2019),
https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/ntablog-the-irs-should-redesign-its-notices
-using-psychological-cognitive-and-behavioral-science-insights-to-protect-taxpayer-rights
-enhance-taxpayer-understanding-and-reduce-taxpayer-burden/
[https://perma.cc/W97B
-UFFF] (referring to notices in general, not educational letters in particular).
210 As governments in many other countries have done, the IRS has borrowed upon
behavioral science, psychology, and cognitive science in connection with its tax compliance
research; the IRS can use insights gleaned from its studies to design a social media soft
letter and determine which taxpayers should receive it. See TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV.,
LITERATURE REVIEW: IMPROVING NOTICES USING PSYCHOLOGICAL, COGNITIVE, AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE INSIGHTS, 2 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 194 (2018).
211 See, e.g., Keith Fogg, IRS Large Case Examination Rate Collapses, PROCEDURALLY
TAXING (July 13, 2020), https://procedurallytaxing.com/irs-large-case-examination-rate
-collapses/ [https://perma.cc/VTL2-ECTD] (citing statistics from IRS 2019 Databook).
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For example, could the IRS use social media mining to screen for
potential tax protestors? It could set its data mining algorithm to search
for social media posts that repeat or promote frivolous tax arguments,
such as those compiled by the IRS on its website.212
With respect to pursuing wealthy tax cheats, the IRS might wish to
look to the examples of state revenue agencies and foreign revenue
agencies using high-tech methods in enforcement. The New York State
Department of Taxation is well known for using invasive methods
(including social media) to track individuals who have ties to New
York but claim to reside in lower-tax states on their tax filings.213
These residency audits are aimed, strategically, at the wealthy as a
means of maximizing the state’s revenue base.214 Greece made
headlines when it used police helicopters and satellite images from
Google Earth to locate home swimming pools as part of a large-scale
crackdown on tax evasion and unreported income.215
From a cost-benefit perspective, it makes sense to aim these
initiatives at the wealthy if the revenue recouped from the positive
results will offset the costs of chasing false leads. To some, these
initiatives may create “feel-good” stories with the hope that such stories
will boost tax morale (and thus boost individual compliance) among
the larger public.216 Personally, I do not like the idea of the IRS
tracking any class of individuals’ movements electronically—
normatively, this is more privacy than I wish for the public to sacrifice
in the name of revenue collection217—so I do not favor this approach
212 The Truth About Frivolous Tax Arguments, IRS (May 1, 2020), https://www.irs.gov
/privacy-disclosure/the-truth-about-frivolous-tax-arguments-introduction [https://perma.cc
/958W-MGGX].
213 See, e.g., Robert Frank, Tax Collectors Chase Rich New Yorkers Moving to Low-Tax
States. Auditors Inspect Cell Records, Even Your Dog’s Vet Bills, CNBC (Mar. 8, 2019,
7:05 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/08/tax-collectors-chase-rich-new-yorkers-moving
-to-low-tax-states.html [https://perma.cc/2EHE-ECL4].
214 Id. (“New York can’t afford to lose many millionaires or billionaires. The top 1
percent of earners pays 46 percent of the state’s income taxes . . . .”).
215 Daniel Steinvorth, Finding Swimming Pools with Google Earth: Greek Government
Hauls in Billions in Back Taxes, SPIEGEL INT’L (Aug. 2, 2010, 2:48 PM), https://www
.spiegel.de/international/europe/finding-swimming-pools-with-google-earth-greek-govern
ment-hauls-in-billions-in-back-taxes-a-709703.html [https://perma.cc/NCA5-V553]
(describing how these tactics revealed that the suburbs of Athens had 16,974 swimming
pools, rather than the 324 that had been reported).
216 Studies suggest that taxpayer compliance is directly correlated to perceived
compliance of others. See, e.g., Alm et al., supra note 104, at 297.
217 Recall that the IRS states that taxpayers have the right to expect enforcement action
will be “no more intrusive than necessary.” In my opinion, using data mining and
technological surveillance to track the personal lives of taxpayers without a specific
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even if targeted to the wealthy. But to the extent the IRS wishes to adopt
these methods, I prefer targeting tax protestors, or the wealthy, to the
idea of training an algorithm to tease out whether a poor person earns
a little bit of extra cash on the side or whether a person in a $25 per
month installment agreement could afford to pay a slightly higher
amount but for the fact that she is smoking a pack of cigarettes a day.
Targeting specific groups other than the poor would also serve as a
counterweight to the fact that the lowest-income taxpayers are already
subject to such a high audit rate. If nothing else, the agency’s
enforcement efforts would be spread among a larger group of taxpayers
(instead of increasing the focus on the poorest).
6. Use Social Media Mining Only at Taxpayer’s Request, as a Method
of Dispute Resolution
As mentioned in the introduction, the RFI also raises the prospect of
using a social media tool to protect taxpayers. While I do not favor the
IRS searching individual taxpayers’ social media in any capacity, I
would be curious to see how the IRS might use it to protect taxpayers:
trading off taxpayer privacy only for good, rather than for
enforcement.218 Recall the example of the man in Detroit who was
wrongfully arrested and could have invoked social media in his alibi—
are there similar analogies to be envisioned for taxpayers?219
Imagine if taxpayers could turn social media in their favor, electing
at their option to use it as a defense or to substantiate their claims in
disputes. For example, IRS underreporter notices are sometimes the
first clue to taxpayers that they are victims of identity theft; because the
notice lists all tax information reported by third parties, the taxpayer
will see if income is wrongly reported by an unknown person who is
working under the taxpayer’s social security number. In those cases,
the taxpayer must contact the IRS and establish that the income listed
on the notice does not belong to the taxpayer. Perhaps in some cases a
taxpayer could use social media posts to demonstrate to the IRS that
they had only one place of employment or that they had no connection

suspicion of tax noncompliance is far more intrusive than tracking wages and financial
transactions, the latter of which are justifiable for a revenue agency.
218 Relatedly, though not specific to social media, see W. Edward Afield, Moving Tax
Disputes Online Without Leaving Taxpayer Rights Behind, 74 TAX LAW. 1 (2020)
(imagining how the IRS can deploy technology to resolve tax disputes in ways that are protaxpayer rights).
219 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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to the geographic location where the income was reported under their
number.
Perhaps social media could be used (again, I would propose it be
allowed only at the taxpayer’s election) to substantiate an EITC claim
upon examination. The IRS could institute a policy that the agency may
consider a taxpayer’s social media evidence within its discretion; to
protect taxpayers, it could further adopt a policy that no negative
inference can be drawn from the social media sources.
Some individuals have turned to technology (and opted to sacrifice
a bit of their own privacy) as a method of tax planning: as a response
to state residency tax audits, tax-specific compliance tools have
become commercially available. Monaeo sells a so-called personal and
audit defense system, which consists of an app and web interface that
enable users to track and log their days in and out of a state, ensuring
that they do not trip into residency status.220
In discussing compliance burdens and how cultural norms around
technology and privacy have changed and will continue to evolve,
Michael Hatfield imagines a future in which taxpayers could choose
between two systems depending on their privacy preference.221 One
option Hatfield sets forth would be to voluntarily sacrifice privacy (by
consenting to data surveillance) and in exchange receive certain tax
benefits; the other option would be to opt out of surveillance and as a
result give up the tax benefit.222 At least such a regime would put the
taxpayer in control.
III
BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR REPRESENTING LOW-INCOME
TAXPAYERS IN THE #TMI ERA
In light of the IRS social media request for information, as well as
broader trends signaling the loss of individual privacy, how should tax
practitioners advise their clients? As the director of a low-income
taxpayer clinic, I am most concerned with this vulnerable population
of clients who receive our legal services on a pro bono basis.

220 Frank, supra note 213. The article states that Monaeo said use of its “Personal
Edition” app is up fifty-one percent in 2018 over 2017. See also MONAEO, https://monaeo
.com/personal [https://perma.cc/RL64-9USL].
221 Hatfield, supra note 198.
222 Id. at 352. Hatfield emphasizes the need for research as to taxpayer preferences, and
he recognizes that “the tax law of 2040 should be fundamentally different than that of 2015
if revolutionary technologies are to be integrated into its administration.” Id. at 366.
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Increasingly, I see social media usage addressed in a variety of ways
as a continuing legal education (CLE) topic. One such seminar advised
lawyers how to use the internet as an investigative tool; the promotional
flyer included agenda items such as “[f]ind out ‘secret’ ways to ferret
out information from social media profiles” and suggested social
media site navigation as a method to obtain background information
about adverse parties, lawyers, judges, and current and potential
clients.223 The CLE flyer suggests other uses for lawyers to navigate
social media sites, including to (1) “[F]ind information to attack a party
or witness’s credibility”; (2) “uncover fraud”; and (3) “seek out the
smoking gun.”224
Other CLE programs include discussion of how the profession’s
ethical rules apply to social media. For example, may an attorney
representing the defendant in a products liability case check the
plaintiff’s social media sites without the plaintiff’s lawyer’s
consent?225 C. Simon Davidson of law firm McGuire Woods posed
this hypothetical and concluded yes, so long as there is no
“communication” with the party or witness.226 Davidson cautions,
however, that some state professional regulations “would prohibit
arguably deceptive conduct designed to gain access” to those social
media sites; presumably this would include setting up a fictional
account to “friend” the party on Facebook or “follow” the party on
Twitter.227
If lawyers are regularly using social media as a tool for opposition
research, what advice are they giving their own clients about how to
manage social media without pitfalls? The obvious advice would be for
clients to simply go dark: no Facebook, no Twitter, no Instagram.
However, that might not be viable advice in the twenty-first century, or
clients may not take it seriously. But it does not hurt to remind clients
that the government may be mining their social media. I have seen posts
by some of my own Facebook friends about how they want to borrow
223 Carole A. Levitt & Mark E. Rosch, Social Media as Investigative Research, GA.
LAWS. CLE, https://georgialawyersclewebinars.ce21.com/item/social-media-investigative
-research-evidence-309411#tabDescription [https://perma.cc/78NN-FW37] (coauthors of
THE CYBERSLEUTH’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET (14th ed. 2017)).
224 Id.
225 C. SIMON DAVIDSON, THE ETHICS OF EMAIL AND SOCIAL MEDIA: A TOP TEN LIST
302 (2017), https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/davidson_hypotheticals_and_analysis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QB8A-WCF2] (providing several examples of cases in which a party’s or
witness’s postings on social media sites were a useful source of evidence).
226 Id.
227 Id.
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someone else’s child for their tax return, and I have seen a compilation
of tweets along the same line.228 I presumed at least certain of these
were jokes, though sometimes it is hard to be sure. Can a data algorithm
perceive a joke?
Criminal defense attorneys advise their clients that social media is
fair game for police investigators.229 In the civil context, divorce
lawyers routinely advise clients to be careful about what they post on
social media, cautioning that content posted can be used for a variety
of purposes.230 Personal injury lawyers have a different set of best
practices regarding social media posts depending on whether their
client is the plaintiff or defendant.231 A concern cited by one plaintiffs’
attorney firm is the tendency of social media posts to broadcast one’s
good news and downplay or ignore bad news, with the unintended
consequence that “defendants looking to escape liability may point to
such photos and posts as evidence that you are not really injured.”232
For this reason, the law firm advises plaintiffs to refrain from social
media posts following an injury.233 Harkening back to the analogy of
228

See Drumbl, supra note 69.
Tom Petersen, If You Are a Defendant in a Criminal Case — Be Careful What You
Post on Social Media, PETERSEN CRIM. DEF. L. (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.criminal
defensene.com/if-you-are-a-defendant-in-a-criminal-case-be-careful-what-you-post-on
-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/XG77-S4CV].
230 See, e.g., Jaliz Maldonado, Family Law: Social Media Evidence in Divorce
Cases, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/family
-law-social-media-evidence-divorce-cases [https://perma.cc/Y2UJ-PFL8]; Larry Upshaw,
Contemplating Divorce? 10 Critical Social Media “Don’ts” You Need to Know,
CONNATSER FAM. L., https://connatserfamilylaw.com/contemplating-divorce-10-critical
-social-media-donts-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/3YWS-332S] (last visited Jan.
24, 2021).
231 See, e.g., Frances Crockett Carpenter et al., Social Media Admissions in Personal
Injury Cases: Mitigating Risk for Plaintiffs, Securing Admissions from Defendants,
STRAFFORD PUBL’NS (May 10, 2017), https://www.straffordpub.com/products/social-media
-admissions-in-personal-injury-cases-mitigating-risk-for-plaintiffs-securing-admissions
-from-defendants-2017-05-10 [https://perma.cc/6WCP-YZ7K] (“This CLE webinar will
provide guidance to personal injury litigators for mitigating the risks that social media posts
pose for their clients, as well as tips for tracking down admissions by defendants on social
media.”).
232 Amalia Lucero, Social Media Being Used as Evidence in Personal Injury Cases,
CURTIS & CO. ATT’YS, https://www.curtislawfirm.org/articles/social-media-being-used-as
-evidence-in-personal-injury-cases/ [https://perma.cc/U9F3-DNAU].
233 Id. Similar advice is found on other personal injury firm websites. See, e.g.,
Adam S. Kutner, How Social Media Can Impact Your Personal Injury Case, https://
www.askadamskutner.com/personal-injury/social-media-can-impact-personal-injury-case/
[https://perma.cc/U4VK-DFGZ] (“[I]f you’re claiming that you have a broken arm, but you
post on social media that you’re going bowling, the defense is going to challenge your
injuries.”).
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other agencies that administer social benefits, an attorney representing
Social Security disability claimants states that he cautions new clients,
“There is a little bitty chance that Social Security may be snooping on
your Facebook or your Twitter account . . . . You don’t want anything
on there that shows you out playing Frisbee.”234
What about in the tax context? Tax attorneys Carina Federico and
Travis Thompson observe, “It is imperative that modern tax
practitioners develop a full understanding of a client’s digital
footprint,” advising that “[c]lient intake questions should include
inquiries about social media usage and online sales through digital
marketplaces, at a minimum.”235 Federico and Thompson further
suggest “practitioners should advise clients to be mindful about what
they post on social media. For instance, a taxpayer should not tell the
IRS that they do not have any money, but then post pictures of himself
on Instagram with expensive cars or on an extravagant vacation.”236 In
the litigation context, tax attorney James Creech advises lawyers to
conduct due diligence of a client’s social media if the case “relies
heavily on the petitioner’s credibility on the witness stand” and warns
of the ethical consequences that may arise if a lawyer finds
contradictory evidence on social media.237
Should low-income taxpayer clinics adopt similar routine
counseling tactics? Should our clients be counseled differently
depending on whether the case involves an examination or a collections
issue?
Beyond just the litigation context that Creech discusses, tax
attorneys should consider the wide range of their due diligence
obligations. Our clients sign financial forms such as a Collection
Information Statement or an Offer in Compromise under penalties of
perjury. The professional regulations governing practice before the IRS
impose upon tax practitioners an affirmative duty to exercise due
234

Pear, supra note 201.
Federico & Thompson, supra note 99, at 46.
236 Id.
237 Creech, supra note 22. Referring to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), Creech argues
that social media posts can be a useful indicator of mindset: “The low threshold for
publication and our cultural habit of oversharing and introspection mean that [social media
posts] are probably a fairly accurate indicator of the declarant’s mental state.” Id. While I
agree with Creech’s advice as to due diligence, it is important to remember that social media
posts are not always an accurate depiction of one’s life. See Houser & Sanders, supra note
14, at 841 (citing Minas Michikyan et al., Can You Guess Who I Am? Real, Ideal, and False
Self-Preservation on Facebook Among Emerging Adults, 3 EMERGING ADULTHOOD 55, 60
(2015)).
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diligence when preparing, assisting with, or approving tax returns and
other documents relating to tax matters, as well as due diligence in
determining the correctness of oral and written representations made
by the practitioner.238 Before submitting such financial forms and
statements to the IRS, it would be prudent to also perform online
searches of our clients to look for inconsistencies, the way that we
might look for inconsistencies in a bank statement that supports such a
form. In the bankruptcy context, there are multiple examples of debtors
who failed to disclose assets or income and later ran into trouble
because of social media posts.239
Elaborating on the point made by Federico and Thompson, I can
envision a number of similarly problematic tax scenarios, particularly
in the collection context. What if social media reveals a side cash
business, even one that is relatively low dollar? For our clients, that
could have an impact on the “ability to pay” calculation, and it could
materially change an Offer in Compromise. Even if the side business is
fledgling or operating at a net loss, the failure to disclose it reflects
poorly on the taxpayer’s honesty elsewhere on the form. Imagine a
client’s Facebook page posting photos of puppies for sale or advertising
to mow lawns or babysit. For low-income taxpayers in collections
cases, even one or two hundred dollars a month of unreported income
can create issues with collections alternatives, making them ineligible
for financial hardship status or forcing a higher minimum payment in
an installment agreement. This is an important conversation to have
with clients and one that can complicate calculation of monthly income
due to the unpredictability of an income stream from such sources. It
prompts a broader question as well: Should tax professionals surveil
their clients’ social media sites looking for any hint of unreported
income in connection with preparation of a routine individual income
tax return?
Another vulnerable category of taxpayers is those requesting
innocent spouse relief. In these cases, a taxpayer who has filed a joint
income tax return with his or her spouse in the past is asking for relief
from the joint liability, either because the IRS examined the return and
238

Treasury Circular No. 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.22 (2021).
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found an understatement of tax or because the return showed a balance
due that was not paid.240 These cases are directed to a centralized unit
of the IRS, where an individual makes a determination using a number
of factors, including the following: whether the requesting spouse had
knowledge, or reason to know, of the understatement of tax when the
return was filed; whether the requesting spouse received a significant
benefit from the understatement or underpayment; and whether under
all the facts and circumstances it would be unfair to hold the requesting
spouse liable for the tax owed.241 When a taxpayer requests innocent
spouse relief, the IRS sends a letter and questionnaire to that taxpayer’s
spouse or ex-spouse (the “nonrequesting spouse”) and uses that
response to evaluate the requesting spouse’s claim.242 If the requesting
spouse appeals the determination in Tax Court, the nonrequesting
spouse has a right to intervene in the case.243 Thus, it would be prudent
for a requesting spouse to be particularly careful about what he or she
posts to social media—both the IRS and the nonrequesting spouse may
be looking at those posts. Of course, if the requesting spouse is in the
middle of divorce proceedings, his or her divorce lawyer may already
have advised him or her to shut down social media sites. But a
significant number of innocent spouse claimants are unrepresented by
counsel,244 particularly low-income claimants, and therefore they are
not privy to such advice.
To reiterate, I am not advising tax attorneys to help their clients
engage in tax fraud, evasion, or any kind of noncompliance. My
concerns are with broader systemic fairness. For example, will the use
of social media mining increase the likelihood that IRS employees will
make moral judgments of the poor? As Eubanks referenced in her
work, we have seen examples in other contexts in which the behavior
240
241

I.R.C. § 6015.
See I.R.C. § 6015; Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-34 I.R.B. 397; I.R.S. Pub. 971 (Oct. 20,

2014).
242 Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-6(a)(1); see also IRM 25.15.3.4 (Dec. 12, 2016) (“The
[nonrequesting spouse] must receive notice of, and an opportunity to participate in, any
proceeding with respect to an innocent spouse relief request.”).
243 See King v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 118 (2000).
244 See generally Stephanie Hunter McMahon, An Empirical Study of Innocent Spouse
Relief: Do Courts Implement Congress’s Legislative Intent?, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 629, 668
(2012) (highlighting the high number of pro se petitioners appealing the outcome of their
innocent spouse determination in court, but also remarking that “representation does not
appear to be a critical matter for determining whether a spouse wins”). Because McMahon’s
study draws upon data from cases litigated in federal courts, her statistics reflect only
requesting spouses who appealed the denial of their request in court, as opposed to the
broader universe of all requesting spouses who submit a request. Id. at 648.
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of poor people is scrutinized, with officials publicly shaming the
behavior as part of a broader policy conversation.245 I can envision a
situation in which politicians question the IRS allowance of a standard
household expense figure by citing examples of individuals who were
granted financial hardship status appearing on social media smoking a
cigarette, drinking a six-pack of beer, or sporting a tattoo. The
underlying expense of any of those things could unfortunately yet
easily become the subject of moral judgment, such as the judgment that
the taxpayer could have allocated that money to rent or food.246
Regardless of whether the IRS chooses to move forward with social
media mining, or whether and how it publicly defines a taxpayer’s right
to privacy, it seems wise to err on the side of assuming that all
electronic transactions, actions outside one’s home, internet activity,
and social media posts may be subject to various levels of scrutiny and
observation.247 As lawyers, whether one is a tax lawyer, a criminal
defense attorney, or a family law specialist, it is prudent to remind our
clients of this twenty-first century technological reality.
CONCLUSION
As I stated at the beginning, this Article is not meant as a defense of
those who cheat on their taxes. I certainly do not condone faking
financial hardship, fudging eligibility for social benefits, or hiding
income from the IRS. Tax compliance is a serious problem, and one
that deserves serious solutions. The underfunding of the IRS is likewise
a serious problem and compels the agency to be creative in its
enforcement solutions.
This conversation is yet another reminder that the IRS is tasked
by Congress with too many responsibilities in addition to tax
administration and revenue collection. The agency is the administrator
of refundable tax credits that operate as social benefits. It plays a
significant role in oversight of the tax aspects of retirement plans,
245 See, e.g., EUBANKS, supra note 30 (discussing how Eubanks uses the example of the
public shaming of TANF recipients who use ATMs in certain locations).
246 See generally Zelenak, supra note 56 (discussing how the public views tax cheats
versus welfare cheats).
247 See, e.g., Heather Kelly & Rachel Lerman, America Is Awash in Cameras, a DoubleEdged Sword for Protesters and Police, WASH. POST (June 3, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/03/cameras-surveillance-police-protesters/
[https://perma.cc/53ZG-9YKA] (describing law enforcement’s use of surveillance cameras,
body cameras, and face- and object-recognition software, as well as private citizens’ use of
smart phones, home security cameras, and vehicle cameras, and describing the metadata
contained in these videos and photos).
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nonprofit organizations, and healthcare-related provisions. It gets
called upon to administer financial aid in times of crisis, as in the
COVID-19 pandemic when the IRS was unexpectedly tasked with
delivering economic impact payments to millions of individuals,
including those with no taxable income or filing requirement. It stands
to reason that the agency—overtasked and underfunded—is searching
for shortcuts in the name of efficiency.
Despite these pressure points, to which I am sympathetic, I sincerely
hope that the agency will choose not go down the road of cheap and
easy in relying on big data and social media analytics for collection and
examination purposes. The IRS aspires in its mission statement to
“enforc[e] the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.”248 In my view,
incorporating social media mining as a routine part of examination and
collection would undermine the dignity of the taxpayers, as well as the
integrity of the agency.
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